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HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT OF A COURTROOM*
INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment has received a tremendous amount of media
and legal attention in the past several years.' Courts were initially
reluctant to acknowledge sexual harassment as a pervasive problem,
despite the alarming number of women claiming to have been
harassed.' The Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill debacle resulted in a
heightened awareness of sexual harassment and illustrated the fears
intrinsic in a legal theory that often pits women against men.'
Women who allege sexual harassment fear retaliation and humilia-
tion, not only in court, but in their personal and professional lives."
* I want to thank Michael Marrs for offering his support, assistance, and friendship throughout
the composition of this Comment. I also want to thank Morrison Torrey for teaching me the
importance of speaking out against injustices facing women and my mother for giving me the
courage to do so.
1. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments:
The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings: Hearing Women, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1333, 1333-35 (1992) (describing how the legal community and media began to acknowledge the
problems of sexual harassment during the Thomas Clarence hearings).
2. In 1976, Redbook magazine published the results of their survey regarding sexual harass-
ment. Of the approximately 9000 women responding, nearly 90% said they had experienced some
type of sexual harassment on the job. The questionnaire was published in January, 1976 and the
results appeared in November, 1976. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 26, 247 n.l (1979) [hereinafter MACKIN-
NON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN]; see also BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE
WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN AND OR-
GANIZATIONS 47-48 (1985) (stating that approximately 53% of working women say they have
been sexually harassed in the work place). Perhaps the most extensive survey taken regarding
sexual harassment was conducted by the United States Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
US. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: Is
IT A PROBLEM? (1981). In 1980, the MSPB surveyed 23,000 federal employees and found that
42% of all women reported some form of sexual harassment. Id. at 2-3. In 1986, a follow-up
study reported that 42% of female federal workers had experienced sexual harassment within the
two previous years. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 2 (1988).
3. In the three months following the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reported a 70% increase in reports of sexual harass-
ment, as compared to the previous year. Mike Feinsilber, Impact Seen in Female Candidacies,
Donations, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 28, 1992, at 2.
4. One judge from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit commented on the
difficulties encountered by Anita Hill when she accused Clarence Thomas of sexual harassment.
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Men fear that their "innocent flirtations" will one day land them in
court with potentially devastating implications.5
Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his . . . terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's . . . sex."6 Two types of sexual
harassment claims have emerged under Title VII - quid pro quo
and hostile environment. 7 Quid pro quo involves a demand for a sex-
ual favor in exchange for an employment benefit or continued em-
ployment.' Hostile environment sexual harassment is defined as un-
welcome sexual conduct which affects a term, condition, or privilege
of employment and may occur in a number of ways, including, but
not limited to, "rape, pressure for sexual favors, sexual touching,
suggestive looks or gestures, sexual joking or teasing and the display
of unwanted sexual materials."
Hostile environment sexual harassment is considered the more
difficult of the two sexual harassment theories to prove, 0 primarily
because the employee may suffer no tangible economic injury." Ad-
During the hearings, we heard more theories about why Anita Hill made her charges
of sexual harassment than one would have thought it possible to conjure up. Among
these were mental derangement, jealousy, disappointment over failure to obtain a pro-
motion, anger that, as chairman of the EEOC, Clarence Thomas made decisions on
the basis'of political expediency rather than on the merits, resentment about his em-
ployment of lighter-skinned women-and yes, always, the liberal conspiracy.
Hon. Stephen Reinhardt, Forward to BARBARA LINDEMANN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOY-
MENT LAW at v, xv-xvi (1992).
5. Id. at xvii. Judge Reinhardt noted "[o]ne obvious brooding omnipresence that affected the
single-gender [Senate Judiciary] Committee was the 'there but for the grace of God go I' syn-
drome. . . . After all, some of what is classified as sexual harassment today was common practice
less than a generation ago." Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). Title VII also prevents discrimination based on race,
color, religion, or national origin. Id.
7. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986) (stating that sexual harassment
occurs in one of two ways: quid pro quo or hostile environment).
8. Id.
9. BARBARA LINDEMANN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 5 (1992). Catharine
MacKinnon has defined sexual harassment as the "unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in
the context of a relationship of unequal power." MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORK-
ING WOMEN, supra note 2, at 1.
10. Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs: Legal Definitions, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 50 (1990).
11. Id. at 50-51. Despite the wide-spread belief that only quid pro quo sexual harassment vic-
tims suffer economic injury, a growing body of data has proven this to be false. Matthew C. Hesse
& Lester J. Hubble, Note, The Dehumanizing Puzzle of Sexual Harassment: A Survey of the
Law Concerning Harassment of Women in the Workplace, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 574, 575-76 n.9
(1985) (citing WORKING WOMEN'S INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON THE JOB:
A PROFILE OF THE EXPERIENCES OF 92 WOMEN. RESEARCH SERIES REPORT No. 3 (1979)). Stud-
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ditionally, men and women often disagree as to what constitutes of-
fensive behavior in the work place. 2 Finally, the line between ap-
propriate and inappropriate behavior may not be as clear as in quid
pro quo harassment.' 3
In November of 1993, the United States Supreme Court con-
fronted the issue of hostile environment sexual harassment in Harris
v. Forklift Systems. 4 Unfortunately, the decision did little to clar-
ify the definition of a "hostile environment" or the type of behavior
that may create one.' 5 The primary issue in Harris was whether a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim could succeed absent
severe psychological injury to the plaintiff.' The Court declared
that such a psychological injury is not a required element of a suc-
cessful claim." Although the decision has been applauded as a vic-
tory for women, 18 the Court left unresolved many important issues."
The Court's failure to provide guidance in determining what type of
behavior violates Title VII reinforces the lower courts' unfettered
discretion to decide issues that primarily involve the credibility of
the victim and personal biases of the factfinder.2"
ies demonstrate that 66% of women who are sexually harassed are either fired or pressured into
resigning. Id. One study traced 81 cases of sexual harassment claims filed with the California
Department of Fair Employment and Housing between 1979 and 1983. Frances S. Coles, Forced
to Quit: Sexual Harassment Complaints and Agency Response, 14 SEx ROLES 81 (1986). Of
those 81 women, almost one-half of the complainants were fired and another quarter quit from
fear or frustration. Id. at 89. Moreover, Barbara Gutek found that over their lifetimes, more than
20% of women have either quit a job, been transferred, been fired, or quit applying for a job due
to sexual harassment. GUTEK, supra note 2, at 58.
12. One extensive study found that 67 % of men surveyed would be flattered if propositioned by
a co-worker, as compared to only 17% of women. GUTEK, supra, note 2, at 96. Only 15% of the
men would be insulted by the proposition, as compared to 63% of the women. Id. Finally, sexual
touching was labeled sexual harassment by 84% of the women, and only 59% of the men. Id. at
43.
13. See supra note 12 (discussing the perspectives taken regarding acceptable or offensive
behavior).
14. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
15. See infra notes 297-424 and accompanying text (discussing the issues Harris failed to
address).
16. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
17. "So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or
abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious." Id. at 371 (citation omitted).
18. Linda P. Campbell, Women Hail Sex Harassment Ruling, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 1993, § 1,
at 1.
19. See infra notes 297-424 and accompanying text (discussing issues left unconsidered by the
Court).
20. The Court's failure to address these issues in sexual harassment cases is particularly dis-
turbing because women have traditionally encountered credibility problems within the legal sys-
tem. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, Sexual Harassment: Its First Decade in Court (1986) in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 103, 110 (1987) [hereinafter, MAcKINNON,. Sexual Harassment] (discuss-
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Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Harris, courts remain
free to resist finding actionable hostile environment sexual harass-
ment by adhering to strict formalities and by imposing stringent
standards not required by statute. For example, although the Su-
preme Court stated, even prior to Harris, that no economic or tangi-
ble injury was necessary for a sexually harassing hostile environ-
ment to exist,21 some courts continued to demand an actual,
demonstrable injury.22 In addition, because Harris failed to discuss
the burden of demonstrating "unwelcomeness," courts may continue
to demand exacting proof by the plaintiff that the harassment was
not "welcome." ' Finally, because Harris did not address the appro-
priate definition of "based on sex," courts may continue to defeat
claims if the harassment cannot conform to a narrow definition of
"based on sex."24
This Comment examines whether these heightened standards of
proof and injury manifest a judicial suspicion of women claiming
ing the acceptance of sexual harassment as a violation of the law and stating, "[o]ne dimension of
this problem involves whether a woman who has been violated through sex has any credibility");
Pollack, supra, note 10, at 69 (stating that "[t]he overwhelming impression created by hostile
work environment sexual harassment cases is that, regardless of the standard applied, women
simply are not trusted"); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and The
Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1013, 1025-31 (1991) (discuss-
ing myths which limit a victims credibility in rape prosecutions). See also 3A WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924a, at 737 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) ("No judge should
ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and
mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician.") (emphasis in
original).
21. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("[Tlhe language of Title VII is not
limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination.").
22. Most courts charLzterize this additional requirement as "severe psychological injury" or
extreme anxiety or debilitation. See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1989)
(stating that plaintiff must suffer anxiety and debilitation to prevail on hostile environment claim);
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring a showing of actual
severe psychological injury to prevail on hostile environment claim), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987); Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring a showing
that plaintiff suffered anxiety and debilitation by the harassing behavior in order to succeed on
claim).
For the purposes of this Comment, the requirement of a heightened level of injury is referred to
as "severe psychological injury." Some courts have not demanded a severe psychological injury,
but nonetheless required an actual injury. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469,
1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that she was actually injured to
succeed); accord Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 687 F. Supp. 848, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
23. See supra notes 194-234 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the plaintiffs
were unable to prove "unwelcomeness" despite explicit requests that the harassing behavior stop
or complaints to management).
24. See supra notes 235-259 and accompanying text (discussing the different interpretations of
"based on sex" and the problems encountered when a narrow definition is employed).
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sexual harassment.2 5 Requiring plaintiffs to fit into such rigid legal
paradigms weeds out claims that judges may view as "unbeliev-
able," "marginal," or "harmless. 12 6  This Comment argues that
judges use these doctrines as proxies to deny claims they deem un-
justified because of one of four misconceptions: 1) if a work environ-
ment is sexually charged, women assume the risk of sexual harass-
ment by entering it;2 7 2) some women deserve and/or welcome
sexual harassment;28 3) women complaining of sexual harassment
are not credible; 29 or 4) men's "innocent flirting" will suddenly be-
25. One commentator noted that "[tihe ease with which plaintiffs may establish a prima facie
case for other kinds of Title VII claims stands in stark contrast to the numerous and difficult
hoops through which a potential plaintiff must jump to assert a claim of sexual harassment suc-
cessfully." B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1993) (footnote omitted).
26. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing possible misconceptions or biases
that function to defeat hostile environment sexual harassment claims).
27. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that courts
should consider "the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment of the workplace" and
the plaintiff's "reasonable expectation ...upon voluntarily entering that environment in deter-
mining whether a Title VII violation occurred"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Wein-
sheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (finding that requests
made by a co-worker that the plaintiff "suck him" and "give him head" were "consistent with the
general environment in the back shop" and therefore not violative of Title VII); Reynolds v. At-
lantic City Convention Ctr., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852, 1866 (D.N.J. May 21, 1990)
(holding that the court "must discount the impact of these obscenities [directed at the plaintiff] in
an atmosphere otherwise pervaded by obscenity . . . [because] [tihese gestures and remarks were
not made in church"), aff'd mem., 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991); Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron,
31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315, 1321-22 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 1983) (finding no Title VII
violation because sexually oriented language was "customary plant language" and "no better or
no worse" than it had been prior to the plaintiff's arrival); see also Collins v. Pfizer, Inc., 39 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1316, 1330 (D. Conn. July 5, 1985) (holding that evidence that co-
workers slapped plaintiff on the buttocks and encouraged her to grab the testicles of a supervisor
is not actionable and merely "conduct not accepted in polite society"); Halpert v. Wertheim &
Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21, 23-24 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1980) (finding that the use of
coarse sexual language was the "language of [the] market place" and therefore not sexual
harassment).
28. See McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that it was the plain-
tiff's personality that created the problems at work, not the sexual harassment); Weinsheimer, 754
F. Supp. at 1566 (finding that plaintiff's personal difficulties interfered with her work, not the
crude working environment); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(finding that the plaintiff's workplace problems were the result of her personality, and not the
vulgar language and sex oriented posters which permeated the work environment), affid, 805 F.2d
611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Tindall v. Housing Auth., 55 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 22, 26 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 4, 1991) (finding that offensive conduct was not truly "un-
welcomed" when the plaintiff "acted like 'one of the boys' "); Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures,
684 F. Supp. 532, 533 (N.D. 111. 1988) (finding that although the plaintiff explicitly rejected the
defendant's repeated sexual advances she failed to show the conduct was "unwelcome"), affid. 913
F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990).
29. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 10, at 52 ("[M]en have difficulty believing, or simply do not
accept, women's versions of [sexual harassment]."); LINDEMANN, supra note 9, at 12 ("An addi-
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come actionable as sexual harassment.30 Specifically, this Comment
analyzes decisions in those circuits which have traditionally resisted
finding hostile environment sexual harassment and addresses the im-
pact of Harris on those circuits. Finally, this Comment argues that
Harris's elimination of the severe psychological injury requirement
did not remedy the underlying misconceptions that act as a bar to
many plaintiffs' claims.
Part I summarizes the evolution of Title VII that led to the recog-
nition of sexual harassment by the courts. Part II discusses hostile
environment sexual harassment opinions to demonstrate the prob-
lematic issues of standard of injury, "welcomeness," and "based on
sex." Part III examines critically these opinions and demonstrates
that Harris failed to address many of the unique problems facing
sexual harassment plaintiffs.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII: The Prohibition of Discrimination
Title VII was included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964." The
intent of Title VII was to outlaw employment discrimination and
create equal employment opportunities for minorities and women. 2
In a landmark decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"s the Supreme
Court stated that the purpose of Title VII is "the removal of artifi-
cial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
tional factor that has been suggested as inhibiting the recognition of sexual harassment as employ-
ment discrimination is the same male-harbored fear of false reporting that once led to testimonial
disabilities placed on women in the prosecution of rape cases."). For a discussion of credibility
difficulties facing female victims of rape, see Torrey, supra note 20, at 1027-31.
30. See Pollack, supra note 10, at 52 (stating that "much of the behavior that women find
offensive is behavior that is accepted as normal heterosexual behavior"). These misconceptions
have been described as constituting an actual defense to sexual harassment. The defendant in a
sexual harassment suit may either: I) claim that the plaintiff encouraged or solicited the harass-
ment (and therefore does not deserve a remedy); 2) deny the behavior altogether (implicating the
victim's credibility); or 3) characterize the offensive behavior as trivial, common, or unharmful
male behavior. George, supra note 25, at 18. Alternatively, the defendant may employ the "pre-
vailing work environment" defense. See supra note 27 (discussing cases in which the plaintiff was
denied relief because the work environment was crude before the plaintiff entered and therefore
the defendant was not liable for a hostile environment).
31. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
32. "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifi-
able group of white employees over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971).
33. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classifications."34 Recent court decisions have
attributed to Congress this same intent to eliminate sexual harass-
ment, stating that "[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile or
offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbi-
trary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harass-
ment is to racial equality. 35 Courts acknowledge that Congress in-
tended to eradicate all types of sex discrimination, despite the
unusual legislative history of Title VII.1 When Title VII was origi-
nally introduced, it did not include a prohibition against sex dis-
crimination. The day before Congress was scheduled to vote on
Title VII, a last minute amendment was offered that proposed "sex"
as a protected category. 8 An opponent of the Civil Rights Act,
Representative Howard Smith from Virginia, is said to have pro-
posed the amendment adding "sex" to Title VII in an effort to de-
feat the entire bill.39 Despite significant opposition, the amendment
passed with a 168-133 margin.4
Title VII was most recently amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991."' This Act will primarily affect sexual harassment litigation in
two areas - damages available to plaintiffs and access to a jury
trial."2 Prior to the Act, successful Title VII plaintiffs were limited
34. Id. at 431.
35. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 902 (lth Cir. 1982)).
36. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of Title
VII).
37. 110 CONG. REC. 1391, 2577-84 (1964).
38. Id. at 2577.
39. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
TION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 17 (1988) ("Smith hoped that by trans-
forming the civil rights bill into a law guaranteeing women equal employment rights with men
• . . the bill would become so controversial that it would fail .... ").
40. 110 CONG. REC. 1391, 2584 (1964). Many Congressmen opposed the amendment. For ex-
ample, Congressman Manny Celler, one of the sponsors of the Civil Rights Act, reacted to the
amendment by stating, "[i]magine the upheaval that would result from adoption of blanket Ian-
guage requiring total equality. .... What would become of traditional family relationships?" Id.
at 2577. Congresswoman Katherine St. George responded that including "sex" as an actionable
category would be "simply correcting something that goes back, frankly to the Dark Ages." Id. at
2581. She declared that "[t]he addition of that little, terrifying word 's-e-x' will not hurt this
legislation in any way." Id.
41. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 111 1991).
42. Id. § 1981a, §§ (a)(l), (b)(1), (c). Section (a)(1) provides "[i]n any action brought by a
complaining party under . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a respondent who engaged in
unlawful intentional discrimination . . . the complaining party may recover compensatory and
punitive damages." Id. § 1981a(a)(l). Section (b)(l) provides: "[a] complaining party may re-
cover punitive damages . . . against a respondent . . . if the complaining party demonstrates that
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to equitable relief.43 Under the 1991 Act, compensatory and puni-
tive damages for intentional discrimination are available, as well as
punitive damages for discrimination proven to be with "malice or
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual.""" Additionally, in cases where compensatory or punitive
damages are sought, either party may demand a jury trial.45
B. Sexual Harassment As Sex Discrimination
Women originally used Title VII to gain access to male domi-
nated jobs.4" By successfully challenging employment practices that
excluded, discouraged, or prejudiced female employees, women were
able to enter some job markets previously closed to them by reduc-
ing instances of unfair treatment based on sexual stereotypes. 7
Courts refused, however, to recognize sexual harassment as a cause
of action within the scope of Title VII." Rather, they tended to
relegate the problem of sexual harassment to the private sphere.49
One court referred to sexually harassing behavior as a "personal
proclivity," not attributable to "sex discrimination" but rather, to
"satisfying a personal urge."'50 Another court stated that harassment
the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or
with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." Id.
§ 1981a(b)(l). Section (c) provides "[i]f a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive
damages ...any party may demand a trial by jury." Id. § 1981a(c).
43. See Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 718 (1978) ("A court
that finds unlawful discrimination may enjoin [the discrimination] ...and order such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement . . . with or
without backpay ...or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.") (internal
quotations omitted). But see Sharon Bradford, Note, Relief for Hostile Work Environment Dis-
crimination: Restoring Title Vii's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 1611, 1615-16 (1990) (arguing
that Title VII, in its pre-1991 Civil Rights Act form allowed for compensatory damages but
courts refused to grant such damages).
44. For the text of § 1981a(b)(1), see supra note 42.
45. For the text of § 198la(c), see supra note 42. The Civil Rights Act is not applied retroac-
tively. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1994). Therefore, its impact on
sexual harassment litigation remains uncertain.
46. Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discus-
sion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE L.J. 854, 866
n.39 (1993).
47. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (invalidating minimum height
and weight requirements for correction facility positions); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (finding the employer's policy of refusing to hire women, but not men, with
pre-school age children violated Title VII).
48. See LINDEMANN, SUPRA note 9, at 10 (stating that five of the first seven courts faced with
the issue found that quid pro quo sexual harassment was not covered by Title VII).
49. MACKINNON. Sexual Harassment, supra note 20, at 110.
50. Jane Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated and re-
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of the female plaintiff was not based on "sex," or sex discrimination,
but on her refusal to have sex with a superior." Developments in
the 1970's and early 1980's expanded the types of behavior prohib-
ited by Title VII, eventually recognizing hostile environment sexual
harassment as a legitimate cause of action.
1. Development of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
In 1976, the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, in Williams v. Saxbe,52 proclaimed that quid pro quo sexual
harassment was actionable under Title VII.55 In that case, the plain-
tiff was fired for refusing to have sex with her supervisor. 4 The
court stated that Title VII's intent was to eradicate all forms of
discrimination based on gender and therefore should encompass sex-
ual harassment.5 5 The court reasoned that if gender was the impetus
for the negative treatment of an employee, then Title VII should
apply.56 This type of sexual harassment, characterized by a demand
for sexual favors under the threat of termination or other detriment,
became known as quid pro quo sexual harassment.5
2. Prohibition of a Discriminatory Hostile Environment
Another development in Title VII jurisprudence occurred in the
1970's. Courts expanded the application of Title VII to cases of ra-
cial and ethnic discrimination created by a "hostile environment." 58
manded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
51. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974), rev'd
sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
52. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds and remanded sub nom. Williams
v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
53. Id. at 657.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 658. The court stated:
Congress's intent was not to limit the scope and effect of Title VII, but rather, to have
it broadly construed. Furthermore, the plain meaning of the term 'sex discrimination'
as used in the statute encompasses discrimination between genders whether the dis-
crimination is the result of a well-recognized sex stereotype or for any other reason.
Id. (footnote omitted).
56. Id.
57. MacKinnon was the first to apply the term "quid pro quo" to sexual harassment cases in
CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 2, at 32.
"Women's experience of sexual harassment can be divided into two forms which merge at the
edges and in the world. The first I term quid pro quo, in which sexual compliance is exchanged,
or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment opportunity." Id.
58. See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir.
1977) (holding that a pattern of derogatory ethnic and racial epithets may violate Title VII);
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In Rogers v. EEOC,59 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff stated a cause of action based
on her employer's discriminatory practice of segregating patients by
national origin.60 Judge Goldberg, writing for the Fifth Circuit,
stated that "the relationship between an employee and his working
environment is of such significance as to be entitled to statutory pro-
tection."6 1 The court noted that Title VII's language:
evinces a Congressional intention to define discrimination in the broadest
possible terms. . . . [Tihe phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment' in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protec-
tive ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged
with ethnic or racial discrimination. 62
In describing the possible negative effects of working in a discrimi-
natory hostile environment, the court posited, "[o]ne can readily en-
vision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination
as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability"
of workers under these conditions." This language became the foun-
dation for requiring a showing of severe psychological injury to suc-
ceed in a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment. 4
C. The Development of Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment
In 1980, prior to judicial recognition of a hostile environment
cause of action under a sexual harassment theory, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated Guide-
Rogers v: EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that differential treatment of pa-
tients because of nationality created a hostile working environment in violation of Title VII), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). A hostile environment based on religious harassment is also recog-
nized as being prohibited by Title VII. See Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D.
Va. 1984).
59. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
60. Id. at 238.
61. Id. at 237-38.
62. Id. at 238. The Fifth Circuit, in the Rogers decision, was credited as being the first court to
recognize that a discriminatory hostile environment violates Title VII. See, e.g., Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) ("Rogers v. EEOC was apparently the first case to recog-
nize a cause of action based upon a discriminatory work environment.") (citation omitted). But
see George, supra note 25, at 9-10 & n.39 (arguing that only Justice Goldberg endorsed com-
pletely the theory that a discriminatory hostile environment violates Title VII).
63. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
64. See infra note 279 (noting that this language in Rogers was mistakenly interpreted to re-
quire a successful sexual harassment plaintiff to show severe psychological injury).
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lines that addressed sexual harassment.6 5 The Guidelines anticipated
hostile environment sexual harassment. Specifically, by extrapolat-
ing the developments in race and national origin discrimination to
sex discrimination, 6 the Guidelines concluded that "[h]arassment
on the basis of sex" and "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture constitute sexual harassment" in violation of Title VII if such
behavior "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hos-
tile, or offensive working environment." 67 In determining if sexual
harassment is actionable, the Guidelines instruct courts to look at
the totality of the circumstances.68 Although the EEOC Guidelines
do not have the force of law, they "constitute a body of experience
65. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1992) [hereinafter, EEOC Guidelines]. The EEOC was created as the en-
forcement agency for Title VII. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
The pertinent portion of the Guidelines state in full:
Sec. 1604.11. Sexual Harassment
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. Unwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct
is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employ-
ment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
EEOC Guideline, § 1604.11(a).
66. LINDEMANN, supra note 9, at 30 (noting that the EEOC borrowed from judicial authority
finding racial and ethnic hostile environments discriminatory in promulgating the Guidelines).
67. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 65, § 1604.11(a). Hostile environment sexual harassment
may resemble quid pro quo if the employee suffers an adverse employment decision at the hands
of the harasser. See generally Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir.
1989) (noting that quid pro quo and hostile environment claims are "not always clearly distinct
and separate" and may actually complement each other). Generally, however, they differ in the
following aspects: I) quid pro quo requires harassment by a supervisor, whereas hostile environ-
ment includes harassment by coworkers or nonemployees; 2) hostile environment is not limited to
sexual advances and can include general conduct of a nonsexual nature directed at complainant
because of gender or sexual conduct not directed at complainant that nonetheless affects the work-
ing environment; 3) hostile environment claims do not require a tangible economic injury; and 4)
in quid pro quo, employer's liability is almost automatic, whereas in hostile environment it is
decided on a case by case basis. LINDEMANN, supra note 9, at 158.
68. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 65, § 1604.11(b). This section states in full:
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Com-
mission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances,
such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged inci-
dents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made
from the facts, on a case by case basis.
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and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance." 9 Shortly after the Guidelines were published,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
ruled that hostile environment sexual harassment was actionable
under Title VII in Bundy v. Jackson.70
In Bundy, the plaintiff claimed that repeated sexual advances by
several supervisors created a hostile environment in violation of Title
VII. 71 When she complained officially of the offensive conduct, her
superior responded that "any man in his right mind would want to
rape you.''72 The district court denied relief stating that "the mak-
ing of improper sexual advances to female employees [was] stan-
dard operating procedure, a fact of life, a normal condition of em-
ployment." 'T On appeal, the D.C. Circuit inferred that the lower
court's decision was based on the plaintiff's lack of a tangible eco-
nomic injury that accompanies quid pro quo claims. 74 Relying on
Rogers and its progeny,76 the D.C. Circuit determined that a hostile
environment created by sexual harassment did indeed violate Title
VII.76 The court argued that the application of sexual harassment
theory to hostile environment situations is necessary to prevent an
employer from sexually harassing an employee "with impunity by
carefully stopping short of firing the employee or taking any other
tangible actions against her."' 77 In support of its position, the court
quoted from Rogers, reiterating that, "[o]ne can readily envision
working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to
destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability" of the
targeted workers. 78 Repetition of the "psychological stability" lan-
69. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).
70. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
71. Id. at 939-40.
72. Id. at 940.
73. Id. at 939 (quoting the district court).
74. Id. at 942.
75. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15
(8th Cir.) (holding that segregated eating facilities created a discriminatory work environment in
violation of Title VII), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545
F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that repeated racial slurs created a discriminatory work
environment); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (hold-
ing that the psychological impact on minority employees from work environment heavily charged
with discrimination fell within the expansive Civil Rights Act language covering "terms, condi-
tions or privileges").
76. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943.
77. Id. at 945.
78. Id. at 944 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972)).
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guage in both Rogers79 and Bundy8" laid the groundwork for subse-
quent courts to reinstate a tangible injury requirement - namely
- proof of severe psychological injury.8
One year after the Bundy decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided Henson v. Dundee,82
which later became an influential case in hostile environment sexual
harassment jurisprudence. 83 In Henson, the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed the lower court's decision to deny liability because of a lack
of tangible job detriment.84 The Henson court reasoned that sexual
harassment, like racial harassment was prohibited by Title VII and
that "a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual
abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work . . . can
be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets." 85
The Henson court enumerated five elements necessary for a suc-
cessful claim of hostile environment sexual harassment.88 First, the
employee must be a member of a protected class.87 Second, the con-
duct complained of must have been "unwelcomed" by the plaintiff.88
Third, the harassment must be based on sex. 89 Fourth, the harass-
79. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
80. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944.
81. See supra note 22 (citing cases requiring the plaintiff to meet the severe psychological
injury standard in order to succeed in a hostile environment sexual harassment suit); see also
Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1990) (considering whether
the harassing behavior affected the plaintiff's well-being); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 633
(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of sexual harassment when
she showed, inter alia, that the harassment was sufficiently persistent and severe to affect her
psychological well-being); Highlander v. 'KFC Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 650 (6th
Cir. 1986) (denying relief because the plaintiff was not psychologically injured).
The Bundy court makes note of the plaintiff's testimony that she endured psychological harm.
Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942. It continues on to say, however, that an "employer can thus implicitly
and effectively make the employee's endurance of sexual intimidation a 'condition' of her employ-
ment." Id. at 946.
82. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
83. See LINDEMANN, supra note 9, at 158 (discussing Henson as a leading sexual harassment
case because Henson examines in depth the theories of hostile environment and quid pro quo
sexual harassment).
84. Henson, 682 F.2d at 900-01.
85. Id. at 902.
86. Id. at 903-05.
87. Id. at 903.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 903-04. The requirement "based on sex" does not necessarily require the harassment
to be a sexual proposition or even sexual in nature. LINDEMANN, supra note 9, at 172-74. For
instance, vulgar language and pornographic displays can contribute to a hostile environment. See
generally Morrison Torrey, We Get the Message - Pornography in the Workplace, 22 Sw. U. L.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ment must affect a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment.90
Finally, respondeat superior must exist.9
The court elaborated on the second element, that of "unwelcome-
ness," stating that "this conduct must be unwelcome in the sense
that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that
the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive. "92
Explaining the third element, that the conduct was "based on sex,"
the court stated that a plaintiff must show, but for her sex, she
would not have been subjected to the offensive behavior. 93 Further-
more, the court declared that conduct equally offensive to both men
and women would not be "based on sex" within the meaning of Ti-.
tle VII. 94
In determining what type of behavior will satisfy the fourth ele-
ment, that the harassment affect a term, condition or privilege of
employment, the court noted that "mere utterance of an ethnic or
racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee
does not affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to
a sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII. ''95 Rather, in
order to state a claim for sexual harassment, the conduct "must be
sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive working environment." 96 The court held that this
standard is met if the conduct is "sufficiently severe and persistent
REV. 53 (1992) (discussing cases in which pornographic displays at work were part of a hostile
environment). Some courts, however, strictly interpret this element and require that the harass-
ment be "sexual" and directed at the plaintiff, as opposed to "based on sex." See infra notes 235-
39 and accompanying text (discussing the possible interpretations of the "based on sex" element).
90. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
91. Id. at 905 (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Respondeat
superior requires that the employer knew or should have known about the sexual harassment and
failed to take prompt action. Id. In Meritor, the Supreme Court failed to issue a definitive rule
regarding employer liability. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69-73. For a detailed
discussion of employer liability in sexual harassment suits, see David Holtzman & Eric Trelz,
Recent Developments in the Law of Sexual Harassment: Abusive Environment Claims After
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 239 (1987); Lisa A. Blanchard, Note,
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Employer Liability for a Sexually Hostile Environment,
66 WASH. U. L.Q. 91 (1988); Gayle Ecabert, Comment, An Employer's Guide to Understanding
Liability for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 55 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1181 (1987).
92. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
93. Id. at 904.
94. Id.
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to affect seriously the psychological well being of employees."9" In
this respect, the court deviated from the EEOC Guidelines which
require only that the "conduct has the purpose or effect of unreason-
ably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
[a hostile] . . .environment." 98 Notably, however, the Henson court
did not purport to require actual injury, only the possibility of such
injury.99
The 1980's proved confusing for sexual harassment plaintiffs and
defendants.' 00 Courts used various tests for establishing hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment, and some courts refused to recognize it
as a legitimate cause of action.' 01 Even those courts declaring that
hostile environment sexual harassment was a legitimate cause of ac-
tion held plaintiffs to extremely high standards. For example, in
Bohen v. City of East Chicago,' the plaintiff was employed as a
dispatcher for the fire department. 0 3 During her course of employ-
ment, she was repeatedly subjected to sexually explicit and demean-
ing behavior.'0 4 The plaintiff reported this behavior to her superiors
on numerous occasions, but no action was taken to correct the prob-
lem.'0 5 Eventually, the plaintiff was fired.' 0 6
Judge Easterbrook, of the United States Court of Appeals for the
97. Id.
98. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 65, § 1604.11(a)(3).
99. See LINDEMANN, supra note 9, at 176 n.63 (stating that the language of Henson "suggests
complainant need not wait for harm").
100. See infra notes 101-260 and accompanying text (discussing cases which applied varying
standards of injury and proof in sexual harassment suits).
101. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1411 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that
the lower court failed to consider whether a hostile environment cause of action existed, concen-
trating only on whether quid pro quo sexual harassment was present); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42-43 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980) (stating that no violation occurred
despite evidence of a hostile environment), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), afid and re-
manded sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
102. 622 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Ind. 1985), affid in part, rev'd in part, 799 F.2d 1180, 1181 (7th
Cir. 1986).
103. Id.
104. The court noted the following:
[A co-worker] would spread his legs while sitting at the console so that [plaintiff]
could not move without touching him. When [the co-worker] was standing, he would
rub his pelvis against her rear. He insisted that she not close the door of the bathroom
when using it. . . . Once she had to fight [the co-worker] off with a clipboard while
trying to dispatch some equipment to a fire. When [the co-worker] spoke to her, the
talk was entirely about sexual matters - in what positions he liked to have sexual
relations, how [plaintiff] should comport herself, and so on.
Id. at 1238.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1237.
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Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation on the district court, found
no actionable sexual harassment under Title VII or the equal pro-
tection clause." 7 Judge Easterbrook found that one of the plaintiff's
supervisors had engaged in behavior such as grabbing the plaintiff's
crotch, rubbing his pelvis against her buttocks, and applying con-
stant pressure for sexual acquiescence. 10 8 The court also found that
another of the plaintiff's supervisors had made a "veiled threat of
rape''10 9 and that the "conversation in the fire station was filled with
lurid sexual descriptions. '""10 Moreover, the court found that "[the
plaintiff] suffered humiliation, anguish, and the costs of two brief
stays in the hospital.""' Based on these facts, however, Judge Eas-
terbrook declined to decide whether this level of harassment rose to
a violation of Title VII." 2 Rather, he found that even if this were
actionable sexual harassment, the plaintiff was fired "for cause" be-
cause she was a "complainer," "obnoxious," and "nosy."" ' 3 Bohen
illustrated the need for Supreme Court elaboration on the necessary
elements of an actionable sexual harassment claim. In 1986 the Su-
preme Court heard its first case addressing hostile environment sex-
ual harassment, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.""
II. FROM Meritor to Harris
A. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
In Meritor, the plaintiff Vinson filed a claim of sexual harassment
against her employer, Meritor Savings Bank and her supervisor,
Sidney Taylor. 1 5 Vinson alleged that the defendant Taylor repeat-
edly demanded sexual favors, fondled her in front of other employ-
ees, followed her into the women's restroom, and exposed himself to
her." 6 Moreover, Vinson testified that the defendant coerced her
107. Id. Because Bohen was employed by the state, she also brought an equal protection claim.
Id.
108. Id. at 1238.
109. Id. One captain stated that Bohen needed someone "to drag her into the bushes for a good
fuck." Id.
110. Id. at 1240
111. Id. at 1238.
112. Id. at 1244.
113. Id. at 1241. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the Title VII count and reversed the equal protection count. Bohen v. City of East Chi-
cago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
114. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
115. Id. at 60.
116. Id.
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into having intercourse approximately 40 or 50 times and that he
forcibly raped her on several occasions. 117
The district court denied relief finding that if, in fact, there was a
sexual relationship between Vinson and her supervisor, it was "vol-
untary.""'  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed." 9 The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
appellate court.'2 0 In doing so, the Court speculated that the district
court may have denied relief because it erroneously believed "that a
claim for sexual harassment [would] not lie absent an economic ef-
fect on the complainant's employment."'' The Supreme Court
stated that a sexually charged hostile environment may indeed vio-
late Title VII, even absent an economic injury. 22
By examining the language of Title VII the Court concluded that
Title VII "is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimina-
tion.' 23 Rather, it "evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in em-
ployment.' 24 The Court bolstered its decision by looking to the
EEOC Guidelines which "fully support the view that harassment
leading to noneconomic injury can violate Title VII."'1 25
The Court stated that "[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sex-
ually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."' 26 It determined
that the district court's focus on whether Vinson's sexual acquies-
cence was "voluntary" was misguided. 27 Rather, the Court stated,
"[tihe gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged
sexual advances were 'unwelcome.' ",128 In determining "welcome-
117. Id.
118. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980), rev'd,
753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affid and remanded sub noa. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986).
119. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affid and remanded sub noma. Meritor
Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 58 (1986).
120. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
121. Id. at 67-68.
122. Id. at 64.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 65. The Court acknowledged that the Guidelines do not have the force of law but
they "do constitute a body of experience and informed judgement to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
126. Id. at 64.
127. Id. at 68.
128. Id. (citing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.11(a)
(1985)).
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ness," the Court stated that "the correct inquiry is whether respon-
dent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were
unwelcome." 12 9
The Court then examined two standards for determining what
type of conduct creates a hostile environment that would violate Ti-
tle VII. °30 First, the Court cited the standard recommended by the
EEOC Guidelines for evaluating whether harassing conduct is ac-
tionable - namely, whether the conduct unreasonably interferes
with the plaintiff's work performance or creates a hostile or offen-
sive environment. 3 The Court appeared to ratify this test by stat-
ing that "the EEOC drew upon a substantial body of judicial deci-
sions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII affords employees
the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimi-
dation, ridicule, and insult."' 32
Although seeming to endorse the EEOC standard, the Court
nonetheless continued to enunciate another, more strict, standard.' 33
First, it noted that not all sexual harassment violates Title VII. T'3
Specifically, the Court stated that "[flor sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive work-
ing environment.' "'I Under this standard, the harassing conduct
must be severe or pervasive enough to actually "alter" the em-
ployee's work conditions, as opposed to merely "interfering" with
the plaintiff's work performance, as required under the EEOC stan-
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 65; see also EEOC Guidelines, supra note 65, § 1604.11 (a). The first prong of the
EEOC test states that unwelcome sexual conduct is actionable if "such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance." Id. § 1604.11(a)(3).
The second prong of the EEOC test creates an alternative means to finding actionable sexual
harassment if the harasser's behavior creates "an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working envi-
ronment." Id. Therefore, under the EEOC standard, sexual harassment is actionable under two
conditions: if the harassing conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with the plaintiffs work
performance; or if the conduct creates a hostile or offensive working environment. Id.
132. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; see Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The
Supreme Court in Meritor explained that courts may properly look to guidelines issued by the
[EEOC] for guidance when examining hostile environment claims of sexual harassment.").
133. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
134. Id. "[Niot all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term,
condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VIL." Id. The Court states that
a "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee
would not affect the conditions of employment to sufficiently significant degree to violate Title
VII." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
135. Id. (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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dard.13  Therefore, the plaintiff would prevail only if she demon-
strated that the harassing conduct was severe or pervasive enough to
alter her working conditions and create a hostile environment.
1 17
Adding to the subsequent confusion by lower courts as to the ap-
propriate standard to apply in these types of cases, the Meritor
Court quoted the Rogers court.1 38 Discussing the development of
hostile environment cases and the reasons that they violate Title
VII, the Court noted that "'[o]ne can readily envision working envi-
ronments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy com-
pletely the emotional and psychological stability' " of employees
under such conditions.1 39 Although the Court elaborated on the ele-
ments necessary to prove a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim, the nebulous terms "unwelcome," "based on sex," and "se-
vere and pervasive" continued to defy definition.
B. Standard of Injury
Predictably, lower courts interpreted the meaning of Meritor in a
number of ways.140 Although the courts differed as to whether to
apply the EEOC or the Henson standard, the more controversial
issue was whether Title VII required a hostile environment sexual
harassment claimant to suffer psychological injury in order to win
her claim. 4' The Sixth Circuit's decision in Rabidue v. Osceola' 2
136. See Pollack, supra note 10, at 60 (discussing the difference between the EEOC standard
and the Meritor standard and arguing that Meritor accepted the more restrictive standard). But
see Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877 (stating "[w]e do not think that these standards are inconsistent").
137. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
138. Id. at 66.
139. Id. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972)).
140. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (stating that Meritor and Title VII can prohibit sexually explicit materials in the work-
place). Contra Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that
sexually explicit materials are not outlawed under Title VII), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
See also Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78 (rejecting idea that Meritor requires a plaintiff to suffer
severe psychological injury to succeed). Contra Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213
(7th Cir. 1986) (stating that Meritor requires a plaintiff to suffer anxiety and debilitation in order
to succeed in a hostile environment case).
141. See Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring plain-
tiff to have suffered a severe negative effect on his or her well-being to succeed in hostile environ-
ment claim); accord Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1989); Yates v. Avco
Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Highlander v. KFC Nat'l Management Co.,
805 F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1986) (denying relief because plaintiff was not psychologically in-
jured); accord Rabidue. 805 F.2d at 619; Scott, 798 F.2d at 213. But see Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878
(expressly declining to require severe psychological injury to succeed in claim).
142. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
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illustrates the impact of requiring severe psychological injury in or-
der for a claimant to succeed. 43
1. Requiring Severe Psychological Injury: Rabidue v. Osceola
In Rabidue, the plaintiff filed suit claiming, inter alia, hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment."4 Rabidue alleged that she was sub-
ject to discriminatory treatment which created a hostile environment
because of her sex.14 5 Being the only woman in a managerial posi-
tion in the office, she was subject to comments such as "we really
need a man on that job," regularly excluded from activities for men
only, and denied benefits allotted to the male managers. 146 In addi-
tion to her complaints of disparate treatment by her superiors, one
of Rabidue's coworkers, Douglas Henry, was especially vulgar and
offensive.' 47 Henry regularly referred to women as "whores," and
"cunt[s]," and used other sexist expletives such as "pussy," and
"tits.'1 4 8 In reference to Rabidue, Henry stated "[a]ll that bitch
needs is a good lay.' 4 9 Moreover, the common work areas displayed
pornography featuring naked or partially naked women.' 50 Rabidue
filed several written complaints about Henry's behavior but no ac-
tion was taken to rectify the situation.' Rabidue was eventually
fired, ostensibly for her irascible and opinionated personality and
her inability to work harmoniously with co-workers and
customers. 52
The lower court denied relief because the employer met its bur-
den of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for Rabidue's dis-
charge. 8 Namely, that she had an antagonistic personality. 5 Ad-
(1987).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 614.
145. Id.




150. Id. One of the posters which remained on the wal for eight years showed a prone woman
with a golf ball on her breasts. A man was standing over her yelling "fore" and preparing to take
a swing. Id.
151. Id. In addition, she organized at least one meeting with other female employees to discuss
Henry's offensive behavior. Id.
152. Id. at 615.
153. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d
611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
154. Id.
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ditionally, the court stated that the offensive language and posters
did not create a hostile environment which rose to the level of ac-
tionable sexual harassment.1 55
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court decision, reiterating that Rabidue's discharge
did not "evince an anti-female animus.' 56 For this type of action to
be successful, the court stated that the harassing behavior must
have unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work and created
an "intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment that af-
fected seriously the psycho logical [sic] well-being of the plain-
tiff."' 157 In explaining this criterion of injury, the court noted that
the standard is both objective and subjective.'5 8
First, the conduct must rise to the level of interfering with the
reasonable person's work performance and severely affect the psy-
chological health of the reasonable person. 159 If this requirement is
satisfied, the harassing conduct must actually have interfered with
the plaintiff's work performance, and inflicted a severe psychological
injury.160
The court stated that an evaluation of these criteria required ex-
amining the background and experiences of the plaintiff, her super-
visors and coworkers, as well as "the lexicon of obscenity that per-
vaded the environment of the workplace . . . and [plaintiff's]
reasonable expectation . . .upon voluntarily entering that environ-
ment."'' The court asserted that any outcome would depend on the
"personality of the plaintiff."' 62 The court stated that although
Henry's language may have been annoying, it could not have se-
155. Id. The court concluded that "the vulgar language and sex oriented posters did not inter-
fere with [Rabidue's] work performance." Id. Rather, the court stated that "[Rabidue's] work
problems resulted from her temper and stubbornness." Id.
156. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 618.
157. Id. at 619. The court never explicitly stated from where it drew this standard, stating only
that "[aifter having considered the EEOC guidelines and after having canvassed existing legal
precedent," severe psychological injury is required for a plaintiff to prevail in a Title VII hostile
environment sexual harassment claim. Id.




162. Id. The Sixth Circuit described Rabidue as a "capable, independent, ambitious, aggres-
sive, intractable, and opinionated individual." Id. at 615. It also noted that "[tihe plaintiff's super-
visors and co-employees with whom plaintiff interacted almost uniformly found her to be an abra-
sive, rude, antagonistic, extremely willful, uncooperative, and irascible personality." Id.
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verely affected Rabidue's psychological well being.' 63 Moreover, the
pornographic posters had only "de minimis" effect "when consid-
ered in the context of a society that condones and publicly features
and commercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial er-
otica at the newsstands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and
in other public places."' 64 Hence, offensive conduct and displays
that do not inflict serious psychological injury on the plaintiff were
not actionable as sexual harassment under the Rabidue standard." 5
After Rabidue, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits issued opinions that required
this additional showing of severe psychological injury in hostile envi-
ronment cases.'66 Other circuits have required a showing of an "ac-
tual injury" for a plaintiff to succeed. 67
2. Authority Rejecting Severe Psychological Injury Requirement
The Ninth Circuit and the EEOC have specifically rejected the
Rabidue standard of severe psychological injury.'6 8 Other circuits,
while not addressing the issue specifically, have not explicitly re-
quired a showing of severe psychological injury.'6 9
163. Id. at 622. ("In the case at bar, the record effectively disclosed that Henry's obscenities,
although annoying, were not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff
or other female employees.").
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1561 (1lth Cir. 1987)
(requiring plaintiff to demonstrate severe psychological injury); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d
630, 633 (6th Cir. 1987) (upholding claim where plaintiff showed that harassment was severe
enough to affect her psychological well-being); Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 214
(7th Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff cannot succeed absent a showing of psychological debilita-
tion). Although the Eleventh Circuit requires that the harassment "affect seriously the victim's
psychological well-being" to be actionable, the plaintiffs burden is less exacting in this circuit; see
also Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1561 (stating that the fact that plaintiff was "upset" met the severe
psychological injury requirement).
167. See supra note 22 (citing cases in which the court required some actual injury to the
plaintiff in order for her to succeed).
168. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (expressly declining to apply
the Rabidue standard); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION POLICY GUIDANCE ON
CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT, 8 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 405: 6681, 6690
n.20 (March, 19, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT] (ex-
pressly rejecting the Rabidue standard).
169. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992) (re-
quiring that plaintiff show she belongs to a protected group, that she was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment, that the harassment was based on sex, that the harassment affected a term of
employment, and that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
take proper action, but not requiring psychological injury); accord Carrero v. NY City Hous.
Auth. 890 F.2d 569, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d
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a. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
In 1990 the EEOC issued the EEOC Policy Guidance on Current
Issues of Sexual Harassment. 70 In discussing the method for deter-
mining if an environment is hostile, the EEOC noted that the Sixth
Circuit requires severe psychological injury as an element of stating
a claim.' 7' The EEOC stated, however, that "it is the Commission's
position that it is sufficient for the charging party to show that the
harassment was unwelcome and that it would have substantially af-
fected the work environment of a reasonable person."' 72 The leading
case explicitly rejecting the Rabidue standard is Ellison v. Brady.17 3
b. Ellison v. Brady
In Ellison, the plaintiff filed a claim of sexual harassment based
on a hostile environment against her employer, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS).174 She charged that her co-worker, Gray, sexually
harassed her by repeatedly asking her out and sending her strange
letters.'75 The letters implied an intimacy which was imagined on
the part of Gray and frightening to Ellison. 76 One letter stated in
part "I know you are worth knowing with or without sex.' 7 7 The
letter went on to state, "[d]on't you think it odd that two people
who have never even talked together, alone, are striking off such
104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988) (requiring that the sexual harassment be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive environment, but not
requiring psychological injury); accord Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th
Cir. 1987).
170. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT. supra note 168, at 6690 n.20.
171. Id.
172. Id. The EEOC also addresses other aspects of the Rabidue decision.
The reasonable person standard should consider the victim's perspective and not stere-
otyped notions of acceptable behavior. For example, the Commission believes that a
workplace in which sexual slurs, displays of 'girlie' pictures, and other offensive con-
duct abound can constitute a hostile work environment even if many people deem it to
be harmless or insignificant.
Id.
For a discussion of whose perspective should be used in evaluating these claims, see generally
Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory
and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1406-11 (1992); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist
Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99
YALE L.J. 1177, 1216-19 (1990); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transforma-
tion of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1202 (1989).
173. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
174. Id. at 873.
175. Id. at 873-74.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 874.
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intense sparks."17'  Another letter stated "I cried over you last night
and I'm totally drained today. I have never been in such constant
term oil (sic). . . . I could not stand to feel your hatred for another
day."'1 79 After receiving the propositions and the letters, Ellison tes-
tified she was frightened because she "thought he was crazy" and
"didn't know what he would do next."' 180 She notified her supervisor
of the incidents and requested that either she or Gray be trans-
ferred. 8' Although Gray was initially transferred to a nearby office,
he arranged through union arbitration to return six months later.'82
Upon his return, Ellison filed sexual harassment charges. 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgement to the de-
fendant. 184 The appellate court reasoned that the Supreme Court in
Meritor implicitly adopted the EEOC standard of injury.' 85 While
acknowledging that Meritor also adopted the limiting language in
Rogers, the Court stated that these standards are not inconsis-
tent.1 88 In addressing the defendant's request that it adopt the
Rabidue standard, the court responded, "[w]e do not agree with the
standards set forth in . . . Rabidue, and we choose not to follow
[that decision]."187
The Ninth Circuit opinion points out that the Rabidue require-
ment for severe psychological injury does not follow from the stan-
dard set out in Meritor 8 8 In addressing the "severe or pervasive"




181. Id. When Ellison told her supervisor of Gray's strange conduct, the supervisor responded,
"[Tihis is sexual harassment." Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 874-75.
184. Id. at 872.
185. Id. at 877.
186. Id. at 876 ("The Supreme Court drew its limiting language from Rogers v. EEOC, 454
F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).").
187. Id. at 877.
188. Id. at 877-78. The court also noted that Rogers did not require severe psychological in-
jury. It explained that the Rogers court was merely illustrating what could happen in a hostile
environment when it stated "[o]ne can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted
. . . to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers."
Id. at 878 n.8 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (quoting Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)). Finally, the Court
stated that the Rogers court "did not hold that a hostile environment only exists when the emo-
tional and psychological stability of workers is completely destroyed." Id.
189. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 ("For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently
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of the harasser that must be severe or pervasive, not the affect on
the harassed employee. 190 The opinion states that "employees need
not endure sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is
seriously affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilita-
tion.'"9 1 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit did not require the plain-
tiff to meet a psychological injury threshold and instead examined
the conduct of the harasser to determine its potential to alter the
working conditions of the plaintiff." 2
C. Other Difficult Elements in Sexual Harassment Cases
In addition to the conflict over whether or not severe psychologi-
cal injury is a necessary element to succeed in a hostile environment
sexual harassment suit, courts also grapple with other undefined ele-
ments of sexual harassment. 9 The next section discusses two vague
concepts of sexual harassment jurisprudence: the definition of "un-
welcome" behavior and the definition of "based upon sex."
1. Welcomeness
To qualify as actionable sexual harassment, courts require that
the behavior complained of by the plaintiff be "unwelcome."' 94 For
example, the Meritor Court declared that the "gravamen of any
sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome.' "5 The Court noted that "whether particular conduct
was indeed unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns
largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of
fact."' 96 The Court placed the burden of showing unwelcomeness on
the plaintiff. 97 Questions arise as to what degree a plaintiff must
demonstrate the unwelcomeness of the harassing behavior, what
type of behavior may be considered presumptively unwelcome, and
whether participation in some type of sexual behavior by the plain-
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment. ... ) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
190. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See infra notes 194-259 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of defining and
applying the concepts of "welcomeness" and "based on sex").





tiff constitutes welcomeness to all types of sexual behavior. In deter-
mining welcomeness, Meritor instructed courts to consider the
plaintiff's manner of dress and public expressions. 198 In addition,
courts typically consider the overall atmosphere of the work environ-
ment, the plaintiff's participation or contribution to such an atmo-
sphere, and whether the plaintiff affirmatively verbalized that the
offensive behavior was not welcome. 199 The following cases demon-
strate the difficulties of determining whether offensive behavior is
actually "welcome."
a. Weinsheirner v. Rockwell International Corporation°°
In Weinsheimer, the plaintiff sued her employer for maintaining a
hostile work environment. 0 She was one of several employees who
worked in what was referred to as the "back shop. 202 The plaintiff
testified that she was subjected to weekly requests by a co-worker to
"suck him" or "give him head," a request to "[g]ive [him] some of
that stuff," as well as being grabbed by him in the breast and geni-
tal areas.20 3 The same co-worker held a knife to the plaintiffs
throat, shoved her into a filing cabinet, and threatened to "bang her
head into the ground."20 4 Another co-worker placed his exposed pe-
nis in the plaintiffs hand while she was looking away. 0 In addition,
the plaintiff testified that a supervisor patted her on the rear and
requested oral sex.2 06 Although the plaintiff reported a number of
these incidents, no investigation was undertaken until she left
Rockwell on medical leave. 7
The court found that "[i]t is likely that a number of the incidents
claimed by [the plaintiff] did take place" and that the work environ-
ment at Rockwell was "characterized by an atmosphere of vulgarity
198. Id. at 69.
199. See infra notes 200-34 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts consider
these issues in order to determine whether the offensive conduct was welcome).
200. 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1560.




207. Id. at 1561-62. Weinsheimer took medical leave as a result of the aforementioned events.
Id. The leave was granted based on a letter from Weinsheimer's psychologist in which he diag-
nosed Weinsheimer as suffering from "industrial trauma," with such symptoms as depression,
anxiety, and sleep disturbances. Id.
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and sexual innuendo."208 However, the court also determined that
the plaintiff participated in the sexually explicit discussions at work
and therefore could not show that "the majority of such conduct
[was] truly 'unwelcome' or 'hostile.' "209 Although the plaintiff at-
tempted to refute this finding as evidenced by her frequent com-
plaints, her supervisors testified, and the court accepted, that these
complaints were not taken to be sexual harassment complaints. 10
Instead, they were found to center on "general morale, supervisory
and disciplinary problems in the back shop."2" ' Furthermore, com-
plaints of specific sexual harassment incidents were reported several
months after the fact. 2 Hence, the court determined that when an
offensive work environment is prevalent, and the plaintiff partici-
pates in such an environment, then any derogatory or offensive be-
havior directed towards her cannot be deemed "unwelcomed" for
the purposes of Title VII.21 8
b. Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures2 ""
In Dockter, the plaintiff sued her employer for sexual harassment
based on her supervisor's sexual propositions and touchings2 15 The
district court found that although many of the sexual overtures and
acts alleged did occur, they did not rise to the level of actionable
sexual harassment.2 10 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court on different grounds .2 1
Dockter was hired by James Gannon who became her immediate
supervisor. 1 8 During her first few weeks of employment, Gannon
208. Id. at 1563.
209. Id. at 1564.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. To buttress their decision, the court also found that the offensive behavior inflicted
upon the plaintiff was not due to her sex, but rather, a result of her confrontational and abusive
personality. Id. at 1565. In addition, the severity of the behavior complained of was "consistent
with the general environment in the back shop," "commonplace" and "routine," therefore not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the level of sexual harassment. Id. Although noting that
the plaintiff did suffer psychological injury, the court concluded that this injury was the result of
plaintiff's "personal difficulties" and not the result of her work environment. Id. at 1566.
213. See id. at 1563-64 (finding that although the atmosphere was crude and vulgar, the plain-
tiff could not prove that the offensive conduct was unwelcomed because of her own participation in
the atmosphere).
214. 684 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. I11. 1988), affd, 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 535.
217. Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990).
218. Dockter, 684 F. Supp. at 533.
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made several sexual overtures towards Dockter - including touch-
ing her hair, grabbing her from behind, boasting of his sexual tal-
ents, calling her at home, insisting she join him for supposed busi-
ness meals, and several attempts to kiss her.219 One of the attempts
to kiss her was accompanied by a grabbing of her breast.2 ' All of
Gannon's overtures were explicitly rejected by Dockter.22 1 After the
final incident, which involved Gannon's grabbing her breast, Gan-
non stopped the harassment. 222  Nine weeks later Dockter was
fired. 2
The district court found that this behavior did not rise to the level
of actionable sexual harassment.22' In denying her claim, the court
addressed the welcomeness issue stating "[a]lthough Plaintiff re-
jected these efforts, her initial rejections were neither unpleasant nor
unambiguous, and gave [the defendant] no reason to believe that his
moves were unwelcome. 22 5 It further stated that "[a]fter one mis-
guided act, in which he briefly fondled Plaintiffs breast and was
reprimanded by her for doing so, he accepted his defeat and termi-
nated all such conduct. ' 2 6 According to the court, even explicit,
verbal rejections directed at the offender may not be sufficient evi-
dence to prove "unwelcomeness. ' ' 27
These two cases demonstrate the difficulty facing sexual harass-
219. Dockter, 913 F.2d at 459-60.
220. Id.
221. Dockter, 684 F. Supp at 533.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 534.
224. Id. at 535.
225. Id. at 533.
226. Id.
227. Id. Although the Seventh Circuit did not address directly the "welcomeness" issue, it de-
nied her claim on other grounds. Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff, 913 F.2d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1990).
Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff was fired because of her "attitude and inability to
carry out the tasks [she was] assigned." Id. at 458. It noted that "even if her initial two-weeks
were 'hostile' such as to be actionable under Title VII," because she was fired for other reasons,
she had no remedy. Id. at 461. (emphasis added).
The court rejected the plaintiff's assertions that she was relegated to inferior work assignments
and denied training due to her rejection of Gannon. Id. The plaintiff asserted that the training
would have allowed her to keep her position. The court found that "the only job she performed
• ..during her three months of employment was to try to become proficient on the IBM personal
computer - a job which she did not perform adequately." Id. at 462. Furthermore, the court
noted that "[w]ith regard to the [training program], it is undisputed that [the defendant] paid for
the course and that [the plaintiff] did begin this training, but was required to 'drop out' because
her schedule at work became too busy." Id. These inconsistent findings were used by the court as
evidence that the plaintiff's rejection of Gannon was not related to her inability to receive the
training she was promised. Id.
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ment plaintiffs when attempting to establish "unwelcomeness. '"228
First, Weinsheiiner illustrates that if a work environment is gener-
ally vulgar, then the plaintiff may be held to a higher standard of
demonstrating the "unwelcomeness" of the offensive behavior.2 2 9
This is especially true when the plaintiff uses vulgar or sexually ex-
plicit language herself.2 80 Second, Weinsheimer implicates the idea
of presumptively unwelcome behavior.'3 1 Some of the behavior com-
plained of, such as being shoved into a filing cabinet, being
threatened with a knife, or having an exposed penis placed in one's
hand may be considered presumptively unwelcome.' 3 Third, a
plaintiff's prompt complaint, or lack thereof, regarding the offensive
behavior impacts the welcomeness analysis.' As seen in both Wein-
sheimer and Dockter, however, a complaint or explicit verbal rejec-
tion may not be sufficient to prove unwelcomeness.' 4
2. Based on Sex: Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Center23 5
Although the requirement that the sexually harassing behavior be
"based on sex" appears at first glance to be straightforward, courts
interpret this requirement in a variety of ways.'3 6 Those courts
adopting a narrow definition of this element require that the behav-
228. See infra notes 229-34 and accompanying text (discussing the barriers plaintiffs may en-
counter in attempting to prove the complained of behavior was unwelcome).
229. Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
230. Id.
231. See Childers, supra note 46, at 862 n.29 (discussing the unwelcomeness requirement and
proposing that sexually aggressive conduct be presumed unwelcome unless otherwise indicated).
232. Id.
233. See text accompanying notes 210, 227 (noting that the courts in Weinsheimer and
Dockter discounted the impact of the plaintiffs' complaints of sexual harassment).
234. Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (stating
that the plaintiff's complaints were not perceived as complaints of sexual harassment); Dockter v.
Rudolf Wolff Futures, 684 F. Supp. 532, 533 (N.D. II1. 1988) (stating that an explicit rejection of
the defendant's propositions does not demonstrate "unwelcomeness"), aff'd, 913 F.2d 456 (7th
Cir. 1990).
235. 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852 (D.N.J. May 21, 1990).
236. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (discussing different courts' interpretations
of the "based on sex" requirement). The different interpretations appear to be the result of the
EEOC Guidelines. The Guidelines note that "[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a violation of
• ..title VII." EEOC Guidelines, supra note 65, § 1604.1 1(a). In describing sexual harassment,
however, the Guidelines state sexual harassment is unwelcome "sexual advances, requests for sex-
ual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Id. The EEOC, however, has
clarified the possible conflict by stating "the Commission notes that sex-based harassment - that
is, harassment not involving sexual activity or language - may also give rise to . . .liability ...
if it is ...directed at employees because of their sex." EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT. supra note 168, at 405: 6692.
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ior be sexual in nature, consisting of sexual propositions or touch-
ings.23 A more expansive definition also includes nonsexual conduct
directed at the plaintiff because of her gender as satisfying the
"based on sex" requirement." 8 Finally, some courts may find sexual
conduct not specifically directed at the plaintiff that nonetheless af-
fects the working atmosphere to be "based on sex."' 23 9 It is the first,
narrow definition that is examined here.
In Reynolds, the plaintiff Reynolds sued her employer and union
for, inter alia, hostile environment sexual harassment.4 0 Reynolds
had worked as an electrician at the Convention Center in two capac-
ities: as a regular electrician and as a subforeman (supervisor). 4
She was the only female subforeman 2  Reynolds was the subject of
derogatory names and actions, especially when she functioned in her
supervisory role.2 43 The crew of seventeen, in which she was a super-
visor was fired en masse on a day she was not present.2  The de-
fendants claimed that the firing occurred because of their desire to
fire the head foreman (who had appointed Reynolds as sub-
foreman), and therefore they dismissed the entire crew. 24 5 The fol-
lowing day seven members of the dismissed crew were reassigned to
the Convention Center.24 6 Two days later, there were twelve electri-
cians working at the Convention Center.2  The defendants admitted
that the mass firing was not "business as usual. 248
Prior to being discharged, the plaintiff was subject to verbal abuse
and obscene gestures, including getting the "finger," having a co-
237. See infra notes 240-59 (discussing Reynolds and the court's use of a narrow definition of
"based on sex").
238. See, e.g., McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that any
harassment, even if nonsexual in nature, could violate Title VII if it was due to the employee's
gender).
239. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1485-86 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that
"obscene language and pornography quite possibly could be regarded as 'highly offensive to a
woman who seeks to deal with her fellow employees and clients with professional dignity and
without the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse'" and therefore may create a hostile envi-
ronment in violation of Title VII) (quoting Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106
(5th Cir. 1988)).
240. Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852, 1853
(D.N.J. May 21, 1990).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1855-56.




248. Id. at 1859.
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worker grab and shake his genitals at the plaintiff, and being re-
ferred to as "cunt" and "douche bag cunt."249 When Reynolds was
being considered as subforeman, the business manager at the union
stated "now is not the time, the place or the year [for a] woman
foreman. ' 50 Some male employees refused to work for her when
she acted as subforeman.2 51 Others threatened to quit or did quit
rather than work for her. 252 During the Miss America beauty pag-
eant, an exhibitor requested that she and the other female electri-
cian not be permitted on the floor and the work was subsequently
given to male co-workers. 53 On one occasion, while she and another
female employee were moving heavy boxes, her male co-workers
"stood around laughing and making jokes rather than help
them."254
In denying Reynold's claim, the court noted that the workplace
was "pervaded by a lexicon of obscenity. ' 255 Citing to Rabidue, the
court concluded that "we must discount the impact of those obscen-
ities in an atmosphere otherwise pervaded by obscenity. These ges-
tures and remarks were not made in church. '256 Hence, the court
found these comments did not rise to the level of "pervasive. "257
In addressing the other behavior complained of, the court stated
that the incidents involving refusals to work, the beauty pageant, or
refusals to assist did not constitute acts of a sexual nature, and
therefore were irrelevant to the Title VII claim. 2 58 It noted that
while these "acts do not reflect a strong spirit of cooperation be-
tween the male and female electricians at the Convention Center,"
they also do not fall into the prohibited category of acts of a "sexual
nature" - hence, they were not factored into her Title VII claim.259
It is clear from these cases that courts apply differing standards
and definitions of elements in deciding sexual harassment cases. The
249. Id. at 1856.
250. Id. at 1863.
251. Id. at 1856.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1857.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1866.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1867.
259. Id. As for the comment made by the union representative, that it was not the time, place,
or year for a woman foreman, the court stated that this could be proof that they opposed a woman
subforeman, but that there was no causation between that remark and Reynolds firing. Id.
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concepts of "based on sex" and "welcomeness" were applied in a
non-uniform manner and often were the deciding factors in a partic-
ular case. It was the split in circuits over the severe psychological
injury requirement, however, that prompted the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in Harris v. Forklift Systems."60
D. THE SUPREME COURT REVISITED: HARRIS V. FORKLIFT
SYSTEMS
In Harris, the plaintiff sued her employer Hardy, charging hostile
environment sexual harassment.2 61 A Magistrate was assigned the
case and the district court adopted the Magistrate's report.2 62 The
district court found that although the defendant's conduct was of-
fensive to Harris and would offend the reasonable person, it none-
theless was not actionable because it could not have seriously in-
jured Harris' psychological well-being. 63
The defendant's offensive statements included telling Harris, the
sole female manager, "[y]ou are a dumb ass woman," "[y]ou are a
woman, what do you know," "[wie need a man [for Harris'] posi-
tion," "[let's go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate your raise," as well
as other lewd remarks. 64 In addition, the defendant asked Harris to
retrieve coins from his front pockets, dropped objects on the floor
and asked her to pick them up, and made suggestive remarks about
her clothing. 66 The defendant made many of these statements and
requests repeatedly and in the presence of other employees.266 Har-
ris confronted the defendant about his offensive behavior and ex-
267 tapressed her intent to resign. At that time, the defendant apolo-
gized and promised to refrain from further offensive comment.2 68
Based upon his promise, Harris remained at Forklift.2 69 A few
weeks later, however, the defendant asked Harris if she had secured
260. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), affd,
976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1382 (1993), rev'd and remanded, 114 S.
Ct. 367 (1993).
261. Id. at *1.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *7.
264. Id. at *2.
265. Id. at *3.
266. Id. at *2. At least one comment, the one regarding the Holiday Inn, was made in front of
a client. Id.
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an account by promising to have sex with the customer. 70 Shortly
thereafter, Harris resigned and filed a sexual harassment claim. 2 71
Although the district court found that the defendant was "vulgar"
and "demean[ed] the female employees," 272 it concluded that his
behavior could not have affected Harris' psychological well-being,27 3
despite her testimony to the contrary.7 4 Dismissing the defendant's
comments as "annoying," "insensitive," and "inane," although also
"truly gross and offensive," the court denied recovery because it did
not believe Harris was truly injured by the conduct. 276 Bolstering
this conclusion was that some of the female clerical employees testi-
fied that they were not offended by the defendant. 27 16 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a brief, unpublished
opinion.2 7
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case, declaring that severe psychological injury is
not required to prove a sexual harassment hostile environment
claim. 27 8 The Court noted that neither Meritor, nor the language of
Title VII, justified this heightened standard of injury.2 79 The Court
reaffirmed the Meritor standard requiring that behavior be "suffi-
ciently severe or persuasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment" in order
to violate Title VII.280 In determining whether this standard is met,
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at *5.
273. Id. at *7.
274. Id. at *3. Harris testified that by August of 1987, "she was experiencing anxiety and
emotional upset because of Hardy's behavior." Id. She also stated that "[s]he did not want to go
to work; she cried frequently and began drinking heavily; and her relationship with her children
became strained". Id.
275. Id. at *6-7.
276. Id. at *3. The court noted that "Ms. Hicks [a former receptionist] jauntily testified, 'lots
of people make comments about my breasts.'" Id. Although the district court recognized that
Harris, as the only female manager, may have been more offended than a clerical employee, it
nonetheless attributed great weight to the testimony that other female employees were not of-
fended. Id.
277. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 114 S. Ct.
367 (1993).
278. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
279. Id. at 371. The Court notes that "the reference in [Meritor] to environments 'so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of
minority group workers' merely present[s] [an] especially egregious example[] of harassment. [It]
does not mark the boundary of what is actionable." Id. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,
238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
280. Id. at 370 (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)) (internal quota-
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the Court instructed lower courts to look to the totality of the cir-
cumstances, including 1) the frequency of the offensive conduct; 2)
its severity; 3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or hu-
miliating, as contrasted with "a mere offensive utterance;" and 4)
whether the behavior unreasonably interferes with the plaintiffs
work performance281 The Court acknowledged that although psy-
chological injury would be relevant to proving a claim, it is not re-
quired.282 Moreover, the Court stated that this is not "a mathemati-
cally precise test" and can only be applied "by looking at all the
circumstances. 283
In clarifying the Meritor standard, the Court made clear that an
abusive environment is in itself an unreasonable interference with
the victim's employment. 84 This interpretation differs from the lit-
eral reading of Meritor which required a plaintiff to satisfy indepen-
dently the requirements of "unreasonable interference" and an abu-
sive working environment.2 8 The Court emphasized the subjective
and objective components of this test - both the reasonable person
and the victim must perceive the environment as abusive. 8
Finally, the Court reiterated that no tangible injury of any sort is
necessary to succeed in a hostile environment claim. 8 The Court
stated that sexual harassment "can and often will detract from em-
ployees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on
the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers," but none of
these tangible injuries is necessary. 88
Justices Ginsburg and Scalia both filed concurring opinions.2 89
Justice Scalia objected to the vagueness of the standard and sug-
gested that requiring unreasonable interference with the employee's
actual job performance might provide greater guidance for lower
courts.2 90 He ultimately concurred in the majority's standard be-
tions omitted).
281. Id. at 371.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. "[If] the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work
environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin [it]
offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality." Id.
285. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text (discussing the standard set forth in
Meritor).
286. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
287. Id. at 371.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
290. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia suggested "job performance" as a substitute for
[Vol. 44:545
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cause there was no statutory authority for his proposed standard,
which would require a demonstrable decline in a plaintiff's work
performance. 91
Justice Ginsburg also advocated a slightly different standard . 92
She stated that the language of Title VII indicates that "[t]he criti-
cal issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to disad-
vantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of
the other sex are not exposed.12 93 She too advocated focusing the
inquiry on the plaintiff's work performance.294 However, Justice
Ginsburg's proposed standard would not require the plaintiff's pro-
ductivity to actually decline to prove an unreasonable interference,
but only that the harassing conduct made "it more difficult to do thejob." 295
Although this result is considered a victory for women, 90 the
standard remains inherently vague. The potential for conflicting in-
terpretations is present under the Harris decision, as it was under
Meritor.
III. ANALYSIS - UNRESOLVED ISSUES AFTER HARRIS V.
FORKLIFT SYSTEMS
As stated earlier, prior to the Harris decision, the federal courts
of appeals differed over the standard of injury required to succeed in
sexual harassment claims. 97 This was demonstrated by the circuit
split over the severe psychological injury standard. 98 Although the
Harris decision resolved that particular issue, it did little to clarify
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" as stated in Title VII. Id. Although this standard
may resemble the "unreasonable interference" with the work performance proffered by the
EEOC, it actually would use an "interference with job performance" as its sole measure of an
abusive environment. The EEOC recognizes "unreasonable interference with job performance"
and the creation of an abusive environment as two separate foundations for violating Title VII.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text (stating EEOC Guidelines requirements). Justice
Scalia's suggestion of using "performance" as the sole criterion, and requiring an actual decline,
would obviously narrow the scope of Title VII.
291. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
292. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. This test differs from Justice Scalia's in that it uses exposure to a disadvantageous
term, condition, or privilege as a basis for demonstrating interference with the plaintiff's work
performance. Id.
296. Campbell, supra note 18, at 1. (describing Harris decision as a victory for women).
297. See infra note 298 and accompanying text (describing the conflict).
298. See supra notes 140-97 and accompanying text (describing the circuit split over whether
severe psychological injury was a necessary component of a successful suit).
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what exactly creates a hostile environment. In effect, the decision
permits judges to continue to create standards that reflect their per-
sonal biases.2 99 Those courts which have resisted finding actionable
sexual harassment will be permitted to continue denying claims, de-
spite their inability to require severe psychological injury. By exam-
ining the language and tone of these courts' decisions, it becomes
apparent that the severe psychological injury requirement, as well as
strict definitions of "based on sex" and questionable "welcomeness"
analyses were often used as proxies for underlying factors operating
against sexual harassment plaintiffs.300
Many sexual harassment hostile environment opinions indicate
that certain factors act to undermine the claims of plaintiffs. These
factors appear as recurring themes in some jurisdictions. The first
theme common to several sexual harassment opinions is that if the
work environment was hostile to women prior to the plaintiff's em-
ployment, she assumed the risk of harassment and is therefore
barred from suing.301 A second theme that prejudices many sexual
harassment decisions is that some women, because of a personality
flaw, do not deserve protection from sexual harassment, or alterna-
tively, because of some characteristic the plaintiff possesses, she is
not truly injured by sexual harassment.0 2 The third factor that
defeats many sexual harassment plaintiffs' claims, is the presump-
tion that the plaintiffs are not credible."0 ' Although it is the duty of
all factfinders to judge the credibility of parties to a suit, many sex-
ual harassment opinions appear to presume the plaintiff is lying, de-
spite evidence to the contrary.30 " The fourth and final theme that is
299. Justice Scalia noted: "As a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided juries
[or judges] decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egre-
gious enough to warrant an award of damages." Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(alteration in original).
300. See supra notes 301-424 and accompanying text (discussing the possible biases that act as
a bar to plaintiffs' claims).
301. See supra notes 306-22 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts allowed
the prevailing work environment defense to defeat plaintiffs' claims).
302. See supra notes 323-66 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the court used
an aspect of the plaintiffs' personalities to help defeat their claims). These two factors are really
different sides of the same coin. On the one hand, a plaintiff's personality is such that she "de-
serves" any harassment she encounters, or conversely, her personality indicates that she is not
really offended by any type of harassment. In either situation, the plaintiff loses because she pos-
sesses some characteristic not liked by the factfinder, regardless and in spite of a defendant's
harassing behavior.
303. See infra notes 367-404 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the courts un-
fairly discredit the plaintiffs in order to help defeat their claims).
304. See infra notes 376-404 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the court dis-
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fatal to many sexual harassment claims is the assumption that be-
havior which qualifies as sexual harassment is common male behav-
ior and therefore cannot or should not be outlawed by Title VII. 0 5
A closer examination of the cases discussed in Part II illustrates
these points. This section demonstrates that unreasonable standards
of proof or injury required to succeed in a sexual harassment claim
are merely reflections of biases or misperceptions of the factfinder.
A. "Prevailing Work Environment" and Assumption of Risk
Some courts refuse to grant relief to plaintiffs who voluntarily
enter a work environment that is hostile to women because of the
"prevailing work environment" defense.806 This defense presumes
that a woman assumes the risk of sexual harassment if a sexually
hostile environment existed prior to the woman's entry. 0 Perhaps
the most illustrative example of the "prevailing work environment"
defense appears in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Rabidue v. Osce-
ola.308 The court listed several factors to consider in deciding
whether or not a hostile environment exists, including "the lexicon
of obscenity that pervaded the [work] environment . . . coupled
with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily en-
tering that environment."30 9 According to the Rabidue court, if the
plaintiff voluntarily entered a crude and vulgar workplace, she could
not expect it to change as the result of her presence. In other words,
she knew what to expect, therefore she must accept the conse-
quences. As Catharine MacKinnon notes, "[i]f the pervasiveness of
counts evidence of the defendants' lack of credibility).
305. See infra notes 405-24 and accompanying text (discussing opinions that illustrate this
theme).
306. See supra note 27 (citing cases in which plaintiffs' claims were defeated because they
entered a vulgar or crude work environment voluntarily).
307. See supra note 27 (listing cases where courts considered a woman's "assumption of risk"
in entering the workplace).
308. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
309. Id. at 620. Although it would be comforting to dismiss the Rabidue decision as an aberra-
tion in sexual harassment jurisprudence, it would be inaccurate. Indeed, the Harris district court
decision made favorable reference to Rabidue and even used the Rabidue standard as a point of
comparison for the Harris decision. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL
487444, at *7-8 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), afid, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 114
S. Ct. 367 (1993). The court noted "[i]t is helpful to compare the instant case to Rabidue,
wherein the Sixth Circuit [found] the plaintiff was not the victim of a hostile work environment."
Id. It notes that the Sixth Circuit requires "sexual harassment more egregious" than that present
in Rabidue and would hence require more in the present case. Id.
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an abuse makes it nonactionable, no inequality sufficiently institu-
tionalized . . . would be actionable."' 10 In response to the Rabidue
majority's statement that the "presence of actionable sexual harass-
ment would be different depending upon the prevailing work envi-
ronment,"811 the Rabidue dissent argues convincingly that an em-
ployer who maintained "an anti-semitic workforce and tolerate[d]
. . . 'kike' jokes, displays of Nazi literature and anti-Jewish conver-
sation" would not escape Title VII scrutiny under a "prevailing
work environment" defense.11 2
Nonetheless, some jurisdictions recognize the "prevailing work
environment" as a defense to a sexual harassment charge." 3 The
district court in Harris appeared to adopt this approach. The court
noted that the defendant's "sexual comments were just part of the
joking work environment" to support its rejection of Harris'
claim.314 Similarly, in Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Center,
the court declared that in an environment permeated with vulgarity,
any obscenity directed at the plaintiff would be "discount[ed]" be-
cause the remarks "were not made in church." 15 This finding, in
conjunction with its narrow definition of what behavior was "based
on sex," permitted the court to deny Reynold's claim.316 Simultane-
ously, the court sanctioned the maintenance of a vulgar work
environment.1
The Supreme Court failed to expressly address this issue in the
Harris opinion. 8' In fact, it may have implicitly, albeit unknow-
ingly, endorsed the "prevailing work environment" theory by stating
310. MACKINNON. Sexual Harassment. supra note 20, at 115.
311. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
312. Id. at 626 (Keith, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
313. See supra note 27 (listing cases in which courts considered the "prevailing work environ-
ment"). Many courts have explicitly rejected this notion. See e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carri-
ers, 830 F.2d 1554, 1561 n.13 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that the whole point of sexual harassment
law is to prevent abusive behavior in the workplace that is arguably acceptable in other contexts);
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1525-27 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that
the "prevailing work environment" defense is inconsistent with the intent of Title VII); Bennett v.
New York City Dep't of Corrections, 705 F. Supp. 979, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that simply
because prisons are crude and rowdy "does not mean that anything goes").
314. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444 at *3 (M.D. Tenn. 1991),
aff'd, No. 91-5301, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
315. Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852, 1866
(D.N.J. May 21, 1990). Reynolds was one of only two female employees, and both testified that
the name calling and vulgarity insulted them. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
[Vol. 44:545
1995] HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT 583
that a hostile environment cannot be adjudged without examining
"all the circumstances." '319 Arguably, this could authorize a court's
use of the "prevailing work environment" defense, hence excusing
otherwise actionable behavior. 20
The notion that the "prevailing work environment" trumps an in-
dividual's Title VII rights defeats the purpose of Title VII 21 and
appears to be reserved exclusively for sexual harassment plain-
tiffs.3 22 The obvious difficulty with this approach is that it insulates
from Title VII scrutiny those environments most manifestly hostile
towards women. In direct opposition to the purposes of Title VII,
this doctrine maintains the status quo at the expense of women en-
tering work environments catering exclusively to the sexual norms of
men.
B. The Personality Problems
Some courts also rely on a plaintiffs personality to deny an other-
wise valid sexual harassment claim or to bolster a dubious decision
to refuse relief.323 Reliance on a personality trait to deny relief usu-
ally appears in one of two ways. First, if a plaintiff does not fit the
stereotypical "helpless," "fearful" victim and is instead aggressive
or uncooperative, some courts dismiss sexual harassment of the
plaintiff as either deserved retribution for a troublesome employee
or as merely annoying conduct, not injurious to the plaintiff.3 2 4 The
plaintiff's personality is also used to determine whether the sexual
harassment was "welcomed" by the plaintiff. Here, courts examine
the plaintiffs attire, speech, and any so called "provocative" behav-
ior that could indicate that she "asked" to be sexually harassed.32 5
Although the inquiry into "welcomeness" of sexual attention is in
319. Id. at 371.
320. See id. (discussing language in Harris that could be interpreted in this manner).
321. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the intent of Title VII).
322. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, C.J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part) (arguing that an environment hostile to a particular race would not be
precluded from Title VII scrutiny under a prevailing environment theory), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987).
323. See infra notes 324-66 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts use some
aspect of the plaintiffs' personalities or behavior to defeat their claims).
324. See, e.g., Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615, 622 (finding that 1) the plaintiff was fired because
she was rude and uncooperative and 2) the harassment was merely annoying).
325. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (stating that inquiry into a
complainant's dress and speech is "obviously relevant").
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some cases appropriate,2 it can also be used as a tool to blame
women for unwanted sexual attention.2 7 Both uses of a plaintiffs
personality shifts the court's inquiry away from the unlawful behav-
ior of the defendant, and focuses instead on what the plaintiff may
have done to ask for it.
1. She Deserved It Because...
When the Sixth Circuit declared in Rabidue that an examination
of the "background and experience of the plaintiff" was a necessary
consideration in determining whether a hostile environment exists, it
authorized courts to scrutinize every facet of a plaintiffs personal-
ity. 28 In doing so, it legitimized a court's use of a plaintiff's person-
ality as relevant to the claim of sexual harassment . 2  The logical
conclusion of this line of reasoning is that some plaintiffs do not
deserve protection from harassment because they are "aggressive,"
"intractable" or "opinionated,"330 or conversely, as a result of these
characteristics, these plaintiffs were not really injured.33 ' At a mini-
326. Welcomeness is relevant in the sense that if the behavior is truly welcomed, then it does
not qualify as sexual harassment. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 65 (defining sexual harassment as
unwelcome sexual conduct). This issue is over emphasized by many courts. Usually, the only time
"welcomeness" would be a legitimate issue is when a court is questioning a plaintiff's receptive-
ness to the sexual propositions or touches. See, e.g., Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F.
Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (finding that the "plaintiff's willing and frequent involvement
in the sexual innuendo prevalent in her work area indicate that she did not find the majority of
such conduct truly 'unwelcome' or 'hostile'" and therefore her suit failed). Consequently, if the
court deems that the sexual attacks were welcomed, then it implicitly states that the plaintiff is
filing a false claim. Although this is usually not explicitly stated, if follows that the issue of wel-
comeness is usually moot unless one assumes the plaintiff is lying.
327. See infra notes 342-57 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts misuse
the welcomeness inquiry in order to defeat the plaintiffs' claims).
328. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
329. In addition, the court encourages the examination of the backgrounds of the plaintiff's co-
workers and supervisors. Id. This apparently would establish different standards for different envi-
ronments depending on the social or economic background of a plaintiff's co-workers. It would
also excuse more behavior from certain classes of people. For example, certain behavior in a pro-
fessional atmosphere may be sexual harassment, but it would not be sexual harassment in a blue
collar setting. The Rabidue dissent points out that "[n]o court analyzes the background and expe-
rience of a supervisor who refuses to promote black employees before finding actionable race dis-
crimination under Title VIL." Id. at 627 (Keith, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
330. These were adjectives used by the Sixth Circuit to describe Rabidue. Id. at 615.
331. See, e.g., Tindall v. Housing Auth., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 22, 26 (W.D. Ark.
Jan. 4, 1991) (noting that the plaintiff was not truly offended where she "acted like 'one of the
boys' "); Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1315, 1319 (D.N.J. Mar. 1,
1983) (stating that although the plaintiff was subjectively offended by vulgar conduct she ap-
peared to accept it because she "joined in it as one of the boys" and therefore her claims are not
actionable).
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mum, this personality inquiry often serves to discredit, embarrass, or
deter sexual harassment plaintiffs. 3 2
Bohen v. City of East Chicagol33 demonstrates a court's willing-
ness to use a plaintiff's personality to deny her sexual harassment
claim.,334 In denying the plaintiff's claim, the court noted that "al-
most from the day she joined the department Bohen was a com-
plainer whose deportment became more and more obnoxious. ' 35
The court also notes that "[s]hortly after joining the department,
Bohen was assigned to work [the midnight shift] with Joseph
Creviston . ... [T]he first night she worked with Creviston she
took a short nap and awoke . . . to find Creviston's hand pressed
against her crotch." ' Bohen complained to her supervisor about
this and other such incidents, but no action was ever taken. 3 7 To
characterize Bohen as a complainer ignores the reality of her
situation.
Next, the court dismisses out of hand the possibility that the har-
assment caused Bohen to be "obnoxious."338 Although an expert tes-
tified as to some of the effects of sexual harassment, such as tension
and anxiety, Judge Easterbrook stated: "'Experts' on this subject
know no more than judges about what causes mental changes -
332. Once again, the Rabidue decision itself is a conspicuous example of using the plaintiff's
personality as an excuse for denying her claim. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 612. The Sixth Circuit's
opinion elaborated on Rabidue's various personality traits, stating that she was "abrasive, rude,
antagonistic, extremely willful, uncooperative, and irascible." Id. at 615. Simultaneously, the
court considered Mr. Henry's anti-female epithets and comments such as "[aill that bitch needs is
a good lay" as merely "annoying." Id. at 622, 624. The court appeared to empathize with the
defendant's need to fire Rabidue and ignored the incongruity of the defendant's actions - firing
Rabidue, while only offering "a little fatherly advice" to Henry. Id. at 624.
The Rabidue district court was even more direct about using Rabidue's personality to deny her
claim, stating that "the vulgar language and sex oriented posters did not interfere with
[Rabidue's] work performance. [Rabidue's] work problems resulted from her temper and stub-
bornness." Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 432 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affid, 805
F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1986). As the court of appeals' dissent
notes, however, even if Rabidue did possess negative personality traits, "[t]hese traits [would not]
justify the sex-based disparate treatment" she encountered. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 624 (Keith,
C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). Both Rabidue opinions ignore the inevitable inter-
action between Henry's vulgar and insulting behavior and Rabidue's inability to work harmoni-
ously with her co-workers. Consequently, the courts opined that Rabidue's problematic personality
was unrelated to and independent of her work environment, and therefore her claim was denied.
333. 622 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Ind. 1985), affid in part, rev'd in part, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir.
1986).
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1241.
336. Id. at 1237-38.
337. Id. at 1238.
338. Id. at 1243.
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which is to say that they know almost nothing."33 9
Judge Easterbrook found that Bohen was the "victim of sexual
harassment just as she described it."'3 40 He was unconvinced, how-
ever, that repeated offensive touching, threats of rape, exposure to
constant lurid sexual description, and sexual advances which Bohen
literally had to fight off, would necessarily violate Title VII.841 His
reluctance to find actionable sexual harassment in this situation sug-
gests a general reluctance to accept sexual harassment as a legiti-
mate cause of action. Under his analysis, an employee who is sub-
ject to severe and prolonged harassment, and subsequently files a
sex discrimination suit, may be fired at any time because she is not
likable.
2. She Asked For It: Welcomeness
The Supreme Court has also approved investigating a plaintiff's
personality and behavior in order to determine if a sexual harass-
ment claim is valid. In Meritor, the Court stated that the "grava-
men of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual ad-
vances were 'unwelcome.' "342 In making this determination, the
Court said "[t]he correct inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] by her
conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwel-
come."" " Not only does this shift the burden to the plaintiff to af-
firmatively demonstrate "unwelcomeness," it also directs the inquiry
away from the defendant's actions. The plaintiff's behavior is scruti-
nized in an effort to excuse the sexual harassment." ' The Supreme
Court held that testimony regarding the plaintiff's style of dress and
personal fantasies were "obviously relevant" as part of the "totality
of the circumstances" to determine "welcomeness. ' 45
The assumption of this evidentiary burden is that women who
339. Id. at 1243 n.4.
340. Id. at 1239.
341. Id. at 1244.
342. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
343. Id.
344. Courts will use any remote or dubious indication that the plaintiff did not find the harass-
ment unwelcome to defeat the plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management
Co., 805 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that evidence that the plaintiff asked her supervi-
sor not to intervene in an attempt to deal with the harassment herself helps defeat claim). But see
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the plaintiff's initial request that
her supervisor refrain from interference with the harassing behavior was not fatal to her claim).
345. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69. (internal citations omitted).
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dress or speak provocatively are welcoming sexual harassment. 4 6
Otherwise inappropriate behavior is excused if the woman did not
conform to the court's definition of non-provocative behavior or
dress. 4 Consequently, the sexual harassment victim is considered
to have "precipitated" the harassment by dressing, speaking, or act-
ing in any manner which could be interpreted as "provocative. ' a48
Some courts require more than an explicit rejection by the plain-
tiff before finding the harassment unwelcome. In Dockter v. Rudolf
Wolff Futures, Inc., 4 9 the district court found that the defendant
engaged in sexual touchings, including groping the plaintiff and at-
tempting to kiss her, made numerous sexual propositions, and en-
gaged in other sexual and physical intimidation of the plaintiff.85 0
The plaintiff explicitly and repeatedly rejected these advances. 85 1
Nonetheless, the court found that "[a]lthough the plaintiff rejected
[the defendant's numerous propositions], her initial rejections were
neither unpleasant nor unambiguous, and gave [the defendant] no
346. This is a particularly troubling aspect of sexual harassment jurisprudence. One commenta-
tor noted:
It would be unreasonable to say that a woman who dresses in an "objectively" provoc-
ative manner - if such a thing could ever be defined - welcomes conduct of a sexual
nature from all men in her immediate working environment. The difficulty of assess-
ing what kind of dress qualifies as "provocative," combined with the unfairness of the
presumption that if a woman dresses provocatively she is doing it for the benefit of a
particular man . . . renders [Meritor's] holding on the issue both unwise and skewed
in the favor of the defendant.
Childers, supra note 46, at 872 n.57.
347. The dissent in Ellison noted that "[t]he focus on the victim of the sexually discriminatory
conduct has its parallel in rape trials in the focus put . . . on the victim's conduct rather than on
the unlawful conduct of the person accused." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens, D.J.,
dissenting).
The requirement of "unwelcomeness" is comparable to the requirement of showing "resistance"
for rape victims. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 815 (1991). In both cases,
the courts require affirmative action by the victim to demonstrate an unwillingness to participate.
Some courts require more than several explicit rejections by the plaintiff in order to prove "un-
welcomeness." See, e.g., Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, 684 F. Supp. 532, 537 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
("Although plaintiff rejected [the defendant's numerous propositions], her initial rejections were
neither unpleasant nor unambiguous, and gave [the defendant] no reason to believe that his moves
were unwelcome."), aff d, 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990).
348. As one commentator noted, finding that the plaintiff dressed or acted provocatively
"[n]eatly undermin[es] a plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment with undue and entirely subjective
emphasis on unwelcomeness, [and this type of inquiry relies on terms such as] 'provocative,' 'flir-
tatious,' and 'sexually inviting' as if these were objective realities susceptible to scientific determi-
nation". Childers, supra note 46, at 874.
349. Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
350. Id. at 533.
351. Id.
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reason to believe that his moves were unwelcome."85 2 It is inconceiv-
able that the plaintiff's explicit rejections could fail to notify the
defendant that "his moves were unwelcome." 5
Another way courts use the "welcomeness" issue to defeat plain-
tiff's claims is demonstrated in Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Interna-
tional Corporation.""4 In this case, the court found that because
Weinsheimer participated in the sexual discussions at work, she
could not claim that weekly requests by a co-worker to "suck him"
and "give him head," or his grabbing of her breasts and genitals
were truly unwelcome.3 55 The court simply ignored or dismissed the
abusive physical harassment when Weinsheimer was shoved into a
filing cabinet and had a knife held to her throat. The court noted
that even the incident in which another co-worker placed his ex-
posed penis in Weinsheimer's hand was not reported "until months
later." '56 This led the court to conclude that it must not have really
bothered her.357 To find that any person would "welcome" this type
of behavior seems ludicrous. The court endorsed the theory that be-
cause the plaintiff used coarse and sexual language, she could not
really be offended by any type of blatant sexual harassment, and
therefore, her claim must fail.
3. Another Missed Opportunity
In Harris, the Supreme Court failed to address the relevancy of
this type of inquiry, 3" even though the district court used the per-
sonality inquiry to imply that Harris was not really injured by the
defendant's actions. The district court opinion stated that "[Harris]
would sometimes drink beer with her co-workers after hours, and
would join in the conversations, sometimes with coarse language."35
Apparently, the assumption is that if Harris used coarse language in
a social setting, she cannot be offended by it in the workplace, and if
she socialized or drank beer with her co-workers, then she was not
really offended by the defendant's harassment. Whatever the district
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
355. Id. at 1561.
356. Id. at 1564.
357. Id.
358. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
359. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444 at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 4,
1991), aff'd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
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court's rationale may have been, the opinion makes clear that this
behavior by Harris is relevant as to whether Harris was injured by
the defendant's harassment.38 0 The Supreme Court did not address
this issue, however, and therefore courts are free to inquire into a
plaintiff's activities outside the workplace. 61
Proponents of an unlimited "welcomeness" inquiry would argue
that the danger of limiting these types of inquiries is that sometimes
"welcomeness" can be a legitimate issue."' However, the possibility
for misapplication and, abuse is evident. In Rabidue, the Sixth Cir-
cuit found that a woman who is uncooperative cannot be offended
by vulgar anti-female language and pornography in the work-
place.3 63 In Meritor, the Supreme Court found that a woman's at-
tire is relevant to whether her supervisor's demand for sex is action-
able sexual harassment.36 '  And in Weinsheimer, the court
determined that a woman's use of obscene language intimates a wel-
comeness of even the most egregious sexual harassment.165 Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court's Harris decision failed to address this
issue and left unguided and unrestricted a court's ability to delve
into the personality and privacy of any plaintiff.8 66
C. That's Incredible: Attack on the Plaintiffs Credibility
Courts' initial reluctance to recognize sexual harassment as a vio-
lation of Title VII was, in part, due to the lack of credibility women
have traditionally had within the legal system.867 Although sexual
360. Id. The statement is placed within a discussion of whether or not Harris was injured by
the defendant's conduct, giving rise to the assumption that it was relevant to that discussion. In
another portion of the opinion, the district court states "[n]either do I believe that plaintiff was
subjectively so offended that she suffered injury, despite her testimony to the contrary.. . . Plain-
tiff herself cursed and joked and appeared to her co-workers to fit in quite well with the work
environment." Id. at *7.
361. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993). Rather, the Court stated again to
look to the totality of the circumstances, thereby sanctioning this type of broad based inquiry. Id.
362. See supra note 326 (discussing why truly "welcomed" behavior would not qualify as sex-
ual harassment). Usually, however, it is only useful in those cases in which the court thinks the
plaintiff welcomed the harassing behavior at the time and subsequently fabricated her claim. One
other possible situation in which this issue could arise is determining whether a defendant
"thought" that the sexual harassment was welcome. How this would affect liability is unclear. See
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a defendant could be liable for
sexual harassment without knowing the behavior was unwelcome or offensive).
363. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1986).
364. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1985).
365. Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
366. See supra notes 358-61 (discussing Harris's failure to address this issue).
367. See supra note 20 (discussing the reluctance of courts to believe women's sexual harass-
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harassment is now recognized as unlawful behavior, courts have
failed to eradicate remnants of the outdated notion that vengeful
women regularly fabricate claims against men. Indeed, some courts
strain the boundaries of reality in order to discredit a plaintiff
charging sexual harassment.368
Courts often demonstrate their reluctance to believe women who
charge sexual harassment in one of two ways. First, a court may
simply declare, without explanation, that they find the woman not
credible.,3 69 Second, a court may discredit the woman by finding or
speculating that ulterior motives prompted her to file the com-
plaint.87 0 Ulterior motives are easy for a court to accept because
they are conveniently supplied by defendants as a complement to
defendants' blanket denials, and present an alternate explanation for
the plaintiff's charge. Whatever the supposed ulterior motive is, it
fuels the fear that scorned or angry women regularly file false sex-
ual harassment charges as revenge for some other slight or injus-
tice. 7 1 Moreover, a finding that a plaintiff is not credible may occur
even if the plaintiff has corroborating witnesses or the defendant is
shown to be non-credible.3 72 Whatever path the court follows to con-
clude that a plaintiff is not credible, the result is too often a denial
of her claim. 873 A lower court's finding that the plaintiff is not credi-
ment claims).
368. See infra notes 375-401 (discussing cases in which the court discredits the plaintiffs'
claims despite evidence to the contrary).
369. See, e.g., Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 622 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
(finding that "[s]ome of Bohen's testimony is simply incredible" and nonetheless stating "[y]et for
all this I am convinced that Bohen was the victim of sexual harassment, just as she described it"),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
370. See McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discrediting the plaintiff's
testimony regarding the sexual harassment and determining that the real problem was the plain-
tiff's personality).
371. Although judicial and public attitudes are not well documented in regards to sexual har-
assment, they are documented in regards to rape. The comparison, although not perfect, is helpful
given the similarities of circumstances and defenses in both types of cases. See Torrey, supra note
20, at 1028 n.69 (stating that only 2% of rape claims turn out to be false, yet one study showed
that 40% of Anglo men; 63% of Anglo women; 92% of Black men; 41% of Black women; 73%
of Mexican American men; and 57% of Mexican American women believed that men are often
falsely accused of rape).
372. See infra notes 377-401 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts ignored
the plaintiffs' corroborating evidence or ignored evidence of defendants' lack of credibility).
373. See infra notes 377-401 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts fail to
believe the plaintiffs and consequently deny their claims); see also Estrich, supra note 347, at 848
(noting that "virtually every decision on credibility [in sexual harassment cases] seems to assume
the relevance of factors such as the presence of corroboration and the freshness of the woman's
complaint, treating these factors as neutral indicia of credibility rather than as cards categorically
stacked against women").
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ble is especially damaging because appellate courts generally do not
question or overturn credibility determinations.
37 4
Defendants often employ the "vengeful plaintiff" defense, proba-
bly because it is so effective. 37 5 Courts may believe even a non-credi-
ble defendant's claim that the plaintiff invented the charge to punish
the defendant. 7 6 In Harris, for example, the district court had to
acknowledge that the defendant engaged in the accused conduct be-
cause the defendant admitted it. 377 Given the defendant's admission,
in order to deny relief, the court had to discredit Harris' claim that
she suffered injury as a result of the defendant's conduct.3 7 8 In do-
ing this, the court acknowledged that the defendant "is a vulgar
man [who] demeans the female employees at [Forklift] 37 9 and that
some comments made to Harris were "truly gross and offensive,"38 0
but refused to believe that Harris was injured by this conduct.3 81
Harris testified in detail to the effects the harassment had on her
professional and personal life, but the court simply did not believe
her. 82 Rather, the court speculated that the charge could be the
result of a deteriorating business relationship between Harris' hus-
band and the defendant, as the defendant had claimed. 383 The court
374. Meritor recognized the importance of credibility determinations stating, "the question
whether particular conduct was indeed unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns
largely on credibility determinations." Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
375. See infra notes 377-88 and accompanying text (discussing the defendant's use of this de-
fense in Harris).
376. See infra notes 377-88 and accompanying text (discussing the defendant's assertion in
Harris that the plaintiff filed the suit in retaliation for an unrelated dispute).
377. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., No. 3-89-0557, 1991 WL 487444 at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 4,
1991), affd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
378. The court succeeded in discrediting Harris' claim of injury by simply stating "[n]either do
I believe that plaintiff was subjectively so offended that she suffered injury, despite her testimony
to the contrary." Id. at *7.
379. Id. at *5.
380. Id. at *7.
381. Id. One of the court's justifications for discrediting Harris' testimony that she suffered any
injury was that "[Harris] repeatedly testified that she loved her job." Id. Testimony that a plain-
tiff liked her job, despite the sexual harassment, is often fatal to her claim. In Walter v. KFGO
Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981), the court denied relief to the plaintiff despite numerous
sexual touches and propositions, noting that the plaintiff could not have been affected by the
harassment because she testified that she enjoyed her job. Id. at 1315-16; see also Scott v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding testimony that the plaintiff consid-
ered one of the defendants her friend evidence that she was not really sexually harassed).
382. Harris, 1991 WL 487444 at *3. Harris testified that "she was experiencing anxiety and
emotional upset because of [the defendant's] behavior. She did not want to go to work; she cried
frequently and began drinking heavily; and her relationship with her children became strained."
Id.
383. Id. at *4.
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entertained the defendant's theory despite evidence that the defend-
ant was not a credible witness. It was proven that the defendant had
doctored his records to provide false evidence that Harris was a poor
employee. 84 Additionally, there was evidence corroborating Harris'
testimony that the business relationship between her husband and
the defendant deteriorated only after she filed the sexual harassment
claim. 85 Despite this evidence, the court stated "I am certain that
[the defendant's] business relationship with plaintiff's husband
played more of a role in plaintiff's dissatisfaction with her job than
plaintiff admitted. . . . I do not doubt that plaintiff had some bitter
feelings towards [the defendant] over this."3 86 Even though there
was evidence to corroborate Harris' story regarding the timing of
the business dispute, the court discredited Harris with these state-
ments and justified its finding by suggesting an alternate, and ille-
gitimate motive for her sexual harassment charge.3 87 This, in turn,
bolstered the finding that she was not really harmed by the sexual
harassment. 88
Similarly, the district court in Vinson v. Taylor$89 refused to be-
lieve Vinson's testimony that she was coerced into sexual relations
with the defendant, or that she was forcibly raped by him. 9" During
the trial, the Vinson court refused to allow evidence in Vinson's case
384. Id. at *5. Proof that a defendant doctored records to give the impression that the plaintiff
was a poor employee is apparently not very significant. In the Sixth Circuit Rabidue decision, the
court accepted without explanation that "the district court clearly assigned greater credibility and
weight to the defendant's witness." Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 618 n.3 (6th Cir.
1986), cert. denied,, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). This finding was not questioned by the court of ap-
peals although there was testimony by a co-worker that a supervisor withheld unemployment com-
pensation to Rabidue after she was fired in retaliation for her sexual harassment suit. Id. at 627
(Keith, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). In addition, another co-worker testified that
the same supervisor "instructed Osceola employees to write up negative encounters with
[Rabidue]" threatening that otherwise she would be able to return to work. Id. (Keith, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
385. Harris, 1991 WL 487444 at *4-5. Corroborating evidence was provided by a letter written
by the defendant's secretary. The letter confirmed a telephone conversation which terminated the
business arrangement with Mr. Harris and was dated after Mrs. Harris filed her sexual harass-
ment suit. Id. at *4.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. The court goes on to state "[b]usiness relationships rarely deteriorate just like that,
especially between social friends." Id. The court refers to the Hardys and the Harris's as "social
friends" although there was no evidence indicating they went out on more than one occasion. Id.
389. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1980), rev'd and remanded, 753
F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affid and remanded sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986).
390. Id. at 38.
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in chief to establish a pattern of sexual harassment committed by
the defendant upon other female employees. 91 Although the case
turned into a "swearing match," with the defendant denying all
charges, the court accepted the defendant's position and excluded
evidence that may have corroborated Vinson's case.392 To buttress
its decision to deny relief, the Vinson court stated that if there was a
sexual relationship between Vinson and the defendant, "that rela-
tionship was a voluntary one by plaintiff having nothing to do with
her continued employment."3 98 The court dismissed the idea that
Vinson could have been coerced into a sexual relationship as the
result of the defendant's superior position because "[a]ll raises, bo-
nuses, and promotions were determined by [other officials], not [the
defendant], who only made written recommendations. '"3 94 Given the
fact that the defendant was the bank's branch manager and recom-
mended all "raises, bonuses, and promotions," concluding that the
defendant had no "real" authority over Vinson seems ludicrous. 95
Nonetheless, this conclusion totally undermined Vinson's sexual har-
assment claim.
Similarly, the court in Bohen v. City of East Chicago credited the
defendant's argument that Bohen was fired for "obstreperous and
insubordinate conduct," and not for filing a sexual harassment
claim.396 However, the court found that the sexual harassment had
occurred. 97 This finding necessarily implies that almost every wit-
ness for the defense lied during their testimony. Every person ac-
cused of sexual harassment denied committing it or even being
aware of it. 398 Despite these witnesses' lack of credibility, the court
believed them when they testified that Bohen was fired "for
cause."3 99 Even though the court noted that one of the fire depart-
391. Id. at 38 n.l. The court did advise Vinson that she may be able to introduce this evidence
at a later time, but she did not attempt to reintroduce it. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 42.
394. Id. at 43.
395. Id. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was more realistic and sympa-
thetic to Vinson's claim of coercion noting that "[t]he mere existence - or even the appearance
- of a significant degree of influence in vital job decisions gives any supervisor the opportunity to
impose upon employees." Vinson v. Taylor 753 F.2d 141, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affid and re-
manded sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
396. Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 622 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D. Ind. 1985), ajJ'd in part,
rev'd in part, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
397. Id. at 1240.
398. Id. at 1238-39.
399. Id. at 1241.
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ment's employees was a "drunken letcher (sic)," who drank at work,
and another was "illiterate" and "incapable," it did not question
why they retained their employment, while Bohen, who was quite
"capable," was fired. 400 The court merely concluded that the depart-
ment "live[s] with substandard performance" from its employees. '0 1
These examples indicate a judicial willingness to rely on otherwise
non-credible witnesses or to make unrealistic assumptions in order
to impeach the credibility of sexual harassment plaintiffs. 02 The
Supreme Court's Harris decision did not address this.403 Although
Meritor acknowledged that credibility determinations are crucial to
deciding whether sexual harassment is "welcomed, 404 neither Mer-
itor nor Harris gives any guidance as to how to make these determi-
nations. Given its abstract nature, credibility is not an issue easily
addressed by statements of rules. One possible solution to unsup-
ported credibility determinations is to require courts to base their
credibility determinations on findings of facts that are reported in
the opinion. This would require district courts to at least verbalize
their reasons for finding a plaintiff not credible. It would also allow
reviewing courts to judge the soundness of the credibility determina-
tions made by the district court. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's Harris decision offered no guidance on determinations of
credibility and therefore lower courts retain unfettered discretion to
determine credibility issues.
D. Innocent Flirtation/Common Behavior
The final theme evident in many sexual harassment claims which
serves to deny relief is an underlying fear that normal male hetero-
sexual behavior will become illegal under an expansive definition of
sexual harassment. 05 There is, in fact, empirical evidence demon-
strating that men and women do differ as to what constitutes sexual
harassment when dealing with grayer areas, such as a request for a
400. Id. at 1243.
401. Id. at 1244.
402. See supra notes 377-401 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the plaintiff's
credibility helped to defeat her sexual harassment claim).
403. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (declining to address credibil-
ity issues).
404. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
405. See supra notes 406-20 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts appear to
factor this consideration into determining whether actionable sexual harassment should be found).
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date.406 The concern over ordinary "male behavior" becoming un-
lawful however, seems to have created a judicial backlash which
defeats claims based on this notion, even when the behavior is
clearly outside of the so called "gray" area.
Once again, the most extreme example of this phenomenon is
found in the Sixth Circuit's Rabidue decision.40 7 In regards to the
pornographic material displayed in the workplace, the Circuit court
states that
[t]he sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on
[Rabidue's] work environment when considered in the context of a society
that condones and publicly features and commercially exploits open displays
of written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television,
at the cinema, and in other public places.40 8
In addition, the Sixth Circuit quotes favorably from the district
court's opinion stating "[i]ndeed, it cannot seriously be disputed
that in some work environments, humor and language are rough
hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie
magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to - or can -
change this. 4 0 9
Clearly, this justification for allowing pornography in the work-
place is a perversion of the intent of Title VII.410 If the intent of
Title VII, with respect to sex discrimination, was to maintain the
status quo measured by the outer boundaries of social acceptability,
it would be totally ineffective at preventing sexual harassment.4 1" As
recently as 1980 one court opined that "the making of improper sex-
ual advances to female employees [was] standard operating proce-
dure, a fact of life, a normal condition of employment, 4 1  and
therefore not violative of Title VII.41 1 If the Rabidue standard of
prevailing social standards were applied to test a violation of Title
406. See supra note 11 (discussing the differences between women and men in evaluating what
behavior constitutes sexual harassment).
407. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
408. Id. at 622.
409. Id. at 620-21 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich.
1984)).
410. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the intent of Title VI1).
411. As the Rabidue dissent notes, "I hardly believe reasonable women condone the pervasive
degradation and exploitation of female sexuality perpetuated in American culture." Rabidue, 805
F.2d at 627 (Keith, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
412. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting lower court).
413. Id.
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VII, "improper sexual advances" would never have come under the
purview of Title VII.
Other courts have exhibited a similar, albeit less extreme, ten-
dency to view some plaintiffs' claims of sexual harassment as normal
heterosexual behavior.414 In arriving at this conclusion, courts either
minimize the plaintiffs' injuries or deny them altogether and the de-
fendant is absolved of any wrongdoing.4 15
In Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures,4"1 the district court mini-
mized the impact of the sexual harassment by referring to the de-
fendant's behavior as "preening, primping and posturing. 41 7 When
referring to the defendant's hiring of Dockter, it states "in an effort
to impress [Dockter] and secure her company in the future, he of-
fered her the job at a salary level far in excess of what she was then
making. 41 8 After hiring Dockter, the court of appeal's opinion
states that "the stage was set for [the defendant] to put on his
'show.' "419 Both courts condone the defendant's hiring of Dockter
for the sole purpose of developing a sexual relationship with her.
Furthermore, they imply that the defendant was actually doing her
a favor by hiring her and that based on her salary, she should al-
most expect to be sexually harassed. It is abominable that contem-
porary courts forgive the "purchasing" of women for purely sexual
motives.
Addressing the defendant's grabbing of Dockter's breast, the dis-
trict court states "[a]fter one misguided act, in which he briefly fon-
dled Plaintiffs breast and was reprimanded by her for doing so, he
accepted his defeat and terminated all such conduct. '420 The use of
words such as "posturing," "fondled," and "misguided" implies a
romantic exchange between two consenting parties, conjuring up
images of awkward teenagers.
These decisions trivialize the defendants' conduct and its impact
on the plaintiffs. The message is clear. Women should not expect
men to behave any differently at work than they would elsewhere.
So, if a man is a "sexual beast" unable to control his desire, or a
"smooth talker" putting on a "show" at the plaintiffs expense, too
414. See infra notes 416-24 (discussing opinions that illustrate this phenomenon).
415. See infra notes 416-24 (discussing the lower and appellate court decisions in Dockter).
416. 684 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. II1. 1988), affd, 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990).
417. Id. at 533.
418. Id.
419. 913 F.2d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 1990).
420. Dockter, 684 F. Supp. at 533.
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bad.
The Supreme Court's Harris decision failed to adequately address
this issue. Clearly, there are differing standards of conduct that
should apply to the workplace, as opposed to other situations. Courts
would not question the inappropriateness of intoxication in the
workplace, but some will tolerate behavior such as groping a woman
breasts, " 1 constant pressure for sexual acquiescence,422 or bombard-
ment of sexual innuendo and insult.423 The Supreme Court's failure
to state explicitly that acceptable behavior in the workplace is not
governed by social behavior that may be "acceptable" in other situ-
ations permits lower courts to continue to rely on cases such as
Rabidue424 as good authority.
E. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
It could be argued that the 1991 Civil Rights Act jury provision
may resolve the problems of judicial biases infecting sexual harass-
ment opinions. For instance, because either party may demand a
jury when punitive or compensatory damages are requested, 425 a
plaintiff may not be burdened by judicial misconceptions that serve
to defeat her claim. However, upon examination, it appears that the
availability of a jury may have a very limited impact.426
First, many sexual harassment decisions are dismissed or decided
at the summary judgement stage, without the aid of a jury.427 Sec-
ond, judges still instruct juries as to relevant law in their jurisdic-
tion.428 Third, juror attitudes in rape cases, which can be analogized
421. Id. (finding that repeated propositions and harassment including trying to kiss plaintiff
several times and groping her breast not sufficient to violate Title VII).
422. Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 622 F. Supp. 1234, 1240-41 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (finding
that constant pressure by a supervisor for the plaintiff to engage in sexual activity may not be
sufficient to violate Title VII), affid in part, rev'd in part, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
423. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987).
424. Id.
425. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that the new Act allows for jury trials
in Title VII cases).
426. See infra notes 427-29 and accompanying text (discussing issues which may serve to limit
the impact of jury trials in Title VII cases).
427. See, e.g., Ulrich v. K-Mart Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Kan. 1994) (granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's Title VII claims); Ott v. Dev.
Corp., 846 F. Supp. 266, 277 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting summary judgment in favor of defend-
ant and dismissing plaintiff's sex discrimination claim in its entirety); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Co., 843 F. Supp. 1278, 1284 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (granting summary judgment against plain-
tiff's Title VII sexual harassment action).
428. FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
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to sexual harassment cases, have been shown to be subject to the
same biases that afflict judges in sexual harassment cases.429 Finally,
the creation of judicial standards customarily occurs at the appellate
level, which is beyond the reach of a jury. Consequently, it appears
that the availability of a jury may have a de minimis impact on the
barriers created by judicial biases that serve to defeat many sexual
harassment claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law of sexual harassment is not conducive to eliminating sex-
ual harassment in the work place, given the vagueness of the gov-
erning standards and a court's ability to mold these standards. The
Supreme Court's decision in Harris presented an opportunity to re-
solve many issues surrounding sexual harassment law. Although the
Harris decision removed one barrier to sexual harassment plaintiffs
- the need to demonstrate severe psychological injury - it failed
to address the issues underlying the requirement of this injury.
Courts can no longer require an "actual injury" or "severe psycho-
logical injury" from sexual harassment plaintiffs, but they remain
free to devise other standards which may be equally difficult to
meet.
Noelle C. Brennan
429. See Torrey, supra note 20, at 1046-49 (discussing a survey of potential jurors regarding
their attitudes toward rape which found: 66% saw rape as being provoked by the victim's behavior
or appearance; 34% believed that women should be responsible for preventing their own rape; and
11 % believed that women ask for it).
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